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Abstract
We study online reinforcement learning in average-reward stochastic games (SGs).
An SG models a two-player zero-sum game in a Markov environment, where state
transitions and one-step payoffs are determined simultaneously by a learner and
an adversary. We propose the UCSG algorithm that achieves a sublinear regret
compared to the game value when competing with an arbitrary opponent. This
result improves previous ones under the same setting. The regret bound has a
dependency on the diameter, which is an intrinsic value related to the mixing
property of SGs. If we let the opponent play an optimistic best response to the
learner, UCSG finds an ε-maximin stationary policy with a sample complexity of
O˜ (poly(1/ε)), where ε is the gap to the best policy.
1 Introduction
Many real-world scenarios (e.g., markets, computer networks, board games) can be cast as multi-
agent systems. The framework of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) targets at learning
to act in such systems. While in traditional reinforcement learning (RL) problems, Markov deci-
sion processes (MDPs) are widely used to model a single agent’s interaction with the environment,
stochastic games (SGs, [32]), as an extension of MDPs, are able to describe multiple agents’ simul-
taneous interaction with the environment. In this view, SGs are most well-suited to model MARL
problems [24].
In this paper, two-player zero-sum SGs are considered. These games proceed like MDPs, with the
exception that in each state, both players select their own actions simultaneously 1, which jointly
determine the transition probabilities and their rewards . The zero-sum property restricts that the
two players’ payoffs sum to zero. Thus, while one player (Player 1) wants to maximize his/her total
reward, the other (Player 2) would like to minimize that amount. Similar to the case of MDPs, the
reward can be discounted or undiscounted, and the game can be episodic or non-episodic.
In the literature, SGs are typically learned under two different settings, and we will call them on-
line and offline settings, respectively. In the offline setting, the learner controls both players in a
centralized manner, and the goal is to find the equilibrium of the game [33, 21, 30]. This is also
known as finding the worst-case optimality for each player (a.k.a. maximin or minimax policy). In
this case, we care about the sample complexity, i.e., how many samples are required to estimate the
worst-case optimality such that the error is below some threshold. In the online setting, the learner
1Turn-based SGs, like Go, are special cases: in each state, one player’s action set contains only a null action.
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controls only one of the players, and plays against an arbitrary opponent [24, 4, 5, 8, 31]. In this
case, we care about the learner’s regret, i.e., the difference between some benchmark measure and
the learner’s total reward earned in the learning process. This benchmark can be defined as the total
reward when both players play optimal policies [5], or when Player 1 plays the best stationary re-
sponse to Player 2 [4]. Some of the above online-setting algorithms can find the equilibrium simply
through self-playing.
Most previous results on offline sample complexity consider discounted SGs. Their bounds depend
heavily on the chosen discount factor [33, 21, 30, 31]. However, as noted in [5, 19], the discounted
setting might not be suitable for SGs that require long-term planning, because only finite steps are
relevant in the reward function it defines. This paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to give
an offline sample complexity bound of order O˜ (poly(1/ε)) in the average-reward (undiscounted and
non-episodic) setting, where ε is the error parameter. A major difference between our algorithm and
previous ones is that the two players play asymmetric roles in our algorithm: by focusing on finding
only one player’s worst-case optimal policy at a time, the sampling can be rather efficient. This
resembles but strictly extends [13]’s methods in finding the maximin action in a two-stage game.
In the online setting, we are only aware of [5]’s R-MAX algorithm that deals with average-reward
SGs and provides a regret bound. Considering a similar scenario and adopting the same regret
definition, we significantly improve their bounds (see Appendix A for details). Another difference
between our algorithm and theirs is that ours is able to output a currently best stationary policy at
any stage in the learning process, while theirs only produces a Tε-step fixed-horizon policy for some
input parameter Tε. The former could be more natural since the worst-case optimal policy is itself a
stationary policy.
The techniques used in this paper are most related to RL for MDPs based on the optimism principle
[2, 19, 9] (see AppendixA). The optimism principle built on concentration inequalities automatically
strikes a balance between exploitation and exploration, eliminating the need to manually adjust the
learning rate or the exploration ratio. However, when importing analysis from MDPs to SGs, we
face the challenge caused by the opponent’s uncontrollability and non-stationarity. This prevents the
learner from freely exploring the state space and makes previous analysis that relies on stationary
distribution’s perturbation analysis [2] useless. In this paper, we develop a novel way to replace the
opponent’s non-stationary policy with a stationary one in the analysis (introduced in Section 5.1),
which facilitates the use of techniques based on perturbation analysis. We hope that this technique
can benefit future analysis concerning non-stationary agents in MARL.
One related topic is the robust MDP problem [29, 17, 23]. It is an MDP where some state-action
pairs have adversarial rewards and transitions. It is often assumed in robust MDP that the adversarial
choices by the environment are not directly observable by the Player, but in our SG setting, we
assume that the actions of Player 2 can be observed. However, there are still difficulties in SG that
are not addressed by previous works on robust MDP.
Here we compare our work to [23], a recent work on learning robust MDP. In their setting, there are
adversarial and stochastic state-action pairs, and their proposed OLRM2 algorithm tries to distin-
guish them. Under the scenario where the environment is fully adversarial, which is the counterpart
to our setting, the worst-case transitions and rewards are all revealed to the learner, and what the
learner needs to do is to perform a maximin planning. In our case, however, the worst-case transi-
tions and rewards are still to be learned, and the opponent’s arbitrary actions may hinder the learner
to learn this information. We would say that the contribution of [23] is orthogonal to ours.
Other lines of research that are related to SGs are on MDPs with adversarially changing reward
functions [11, 27, 28, 10] and with adversarially changing transition probabilities [35, 1]. The as-
sumptions in these works have several differences with ours, and therefore their results are not com-
parable to our results. However, they indeed provide other viewpoints about learning in stochastic
games.
2 Preliminaries
Game Models and Policies. A SG is a 4-tuple M = (S,A, r, p). S denotes the state space
and A = A1 × A2 the players’ joint action space. We denote S = |S| and A = |A|. The game
starts from an initial state s1. Suppose at time t the players are at state st. After the players play
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the joint actions (a1t , a
2
t ), Player 1 receives the reward rt = r(st, a
1
t , a
2
t ) ∈ [0, 1] from Player 2, and
both players visit state st+1 following the transition probability p(·|st, a1t , a2t ). For simplicity, we
consider deterministic rewards as in [3]. The extension to stochastic case is straightforward. We
shorten our notation by a := (a1, a2) or at := (a
1
t , a
2
t ), and use abbreviations such as r(st, at) and
p(·|st, at).
Without loss of generality, players are assumed to determine their actions based on the history. A
policy pi at time t maps the history up to time t, Ht = (s1, a1, r1, ..., st) ∈ Ht, to a probability
distribution over actions. Such policies are called history-dependent policies, whose class is denoted
by ΠHR. On the other hand, a stationary policy, whose class is denoted by ΠSR, selects actions as a
function of the current state. For either class, joint policies (pi1, pi2) are often written as pi.
Average Return and the Game Value. Let the players play joint policy pi. Define the T -step total
reward as RT (M,pi, s) :=
∑T
t=1 r(st, at), where s1 = s, and the average reward as ρ(M,pi, s) :=
limT→∞
1
TE [RT (M,pi, s)], whenever the limit exists. In fact, the game value exists
2 [26]:
ρ∗(M, s) := sup
π1
inf
π2
lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
RT (M,pi
1, pi2, s)
]
.
If ρ(M,pi, s) or ρ∗(M, s) does not depend on the initial state s, we simply write ρ(M,pi) or ρ∗(M).
The Bias Vector. For a stationary policy pi, the bias vector h(M,pi, ·) is defined, for each coordi-
nate s, as
h(M,pi, s) := E
[
∞∑
t=1
r(st, at)− ρ(M,pi, s)
∣∣∣s1 = s, at ∼ pi(·|st)
]
. (1)
The bias vector satisfies the Bellman equation: ∀s ∈ S,
ρ(M,pi, s) + h(M,pi, s) = r(s, pi) +
∑
s′
p(s′|s, pi)h(M,pi, s′),
where r(s, pi) := Ea∼π(·|s)[r(s, a)] and p(s
′|s, pi) :=Ea∼π(·|s)[p(s′|s, a)].
The vector h(M,pi, ·) describes the relative advantage among states under model M and (joint)
policy pi. The advantage (or disadvantage) of state s compared to state s′ under policy pi is defined
as the difference between the accumulated rewards with initial states s and s′, which, from (1),
converges to the difference h(M,pi, s) − h(M,pi, s′) asymptotically. For the ease of notation, the
span of a vector v is defined as sp(v) := maxi vi − mini vi. Therefore if a model, together with
any policy, induces large sp (h), then this model will be difficult to learn because visiting a bad state
costs a lot in the learning process. As shown in [3] for the MDP case, the regret has an inevitable
dependency on sp(h(M,pi∗, ·)), where pi∗ is the optimal policy.
On the other hand, sp(h(M,pi, ·)) is closely related to the mean first passage time under the Markov
chain induced by M and pi. Actually we have sp(h(M,pi, ·)) ≤ T π(M) := maxs,s′ T πs→s′(M),
where T πs→s′(M) denotes the expected time to reach state s
′ starting from s when the model is M
and the player(s) follow the (joint) policy pi. This fact is intuitive, and the proof can be seen at
Remark M.1.
Notations. In order to save space, we often write equations in vector or matrix form. We use
vectors inequalities: if u, v ∈ Rn, then u ≤ v ⇔ ui ≤ vi ∀i = 1, ..., n. For a general matrix game
with matrix G of size n × m, we denote the value of the game as valG := max
p∈∆n
min
q∈∆m
p⊤Gq =
min
q∈∆m
max
p∈∆n
p⊤Gq, where∆k is the probability simplex of dimension k. In SGs, given the estimated
value function u(s′) ∀s′, we often need to solve the following matrix game equation:
v(s) = max
a1∼π1(·|s)
min
a2∼π2(·|s)
{r(s, a1, a2) +
∑
s′
p(s′|s, a1, a2)u(s′)},
and this is abbreviated with the vector form v = val{r + Pu}. We also use solve1G and solve2G
to denote the optimal solutions of p and q. In addition, the indicator function is denoted by 1{·} or
1{·}.
2Unlike in one-player MDPs, the sup and inf in the definition of ρ∗(M, s) are not necessarily attainable.
Moreover, players may not have stationary optimal policies.
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3 Problem Settings and Results Overview
We assume that the game proceeds for T steps. In order to have meaningful regret bounds (i.e., sub-
linear to T ), we must make some assumptions to the SG model itself. Our two different assumptions
are
Assumption 1. max
s,s′
max
π1∈ΠSR
max
π2∈ΠSR
T π
1,π2
s→s′ (M) ≤ D.
Assumption 2. max
s,s′
max
π2∈ΠSR
min
π1∈ΠSR
T π
1,π2
s→s′ (M) ≤ D.
Why we make these assumptions is as follows. Consider an SG model where the opponent (Player
2) has some way to lock the learner (Player 1) to some bad state. The best strategy for the learner
might be to totally avoid, if possible, entering that state. However, in the early stage of the learning
process, the learner won’t know this, and he/she will have a certain probability to visit that state
and get locked. This will cause linear regret to the learner. Therefore, we assume the following:
whatever policy the opponent executes, the learner always has some way to reach any state within
some bounded time. This is essentially our Assumption 2.
Assumption 1 is the stronger one that actually implies that under any policies executed by the players
(not necessarily stationary, see Remark M.2), every state is visited within an average ofD steps. We
find that under this assumption, the asymptotic regret can be improved. This assumption also has a
sense similar to those required for Q-learning-type algorithms’ convergence: they require that every
state be visited infinitely often. See [18] for example.
These assumptions define some notion of diameters that are specific to the SG model. It is known
that under Assumption 1 or Assumption 2, both players have optimal stationary policies, and the
game value is independent of the initial state. Thus we can simply write ρ∗(M, s) as ρ∗(M). For a
proof of these facts, please refer to Theorem E.1 in the appendix.
3.1 Two Settings and Results Overview
We focus on training Player 1 and discuss two settings. In the online setting, Player 1 competes with
an arbitrary Player 2. The regret is defined as
Reg
(on)
T =
T∑
t=1
ρ∗(M)− r(st, at).
In the offline setting, we control both Player 1 and Player 2’s actions, and find Player 1’s maximin
policy. The sample complexity is defined as
Lε =
T∑
t=1
1{ρ∗(M)−min
π2
ρ(M,pi1t , pi
2) > ε},
where pi1t is a stationary policy being executed by Player 1 at time t. This definition is similar to
those in [20, 19] for one-player MDPs. By the definition of Lε, if we have an upper bound for Lε
and run the algorithm for T > Lε steps, there is some t such that pi
1
t is ε-optimal. We will explain
how to pick this t in Section 7 and Appendix L.
It turns out that we can use almost the same algorithm to handle these two settings. Since learning in
the online setting is more challenging, from now on we will mainly focus on the online setting, and
leave the discussion about the offline setting at the end of the paper. Our results can be summarized
by the following two theorems.
Theorem 3.1. Under Assumption 1, UCSG achieves Reg
(on)
T = O˜(D3S5A+DS
√
AT ) w.h.p. 3
Theorem 3.2. Under Assumption 2, UCSG achieves Reg
(on)
T = O˜( 3
√
DS2AT 2) w.h.p.
4 Upper Confidence Stochastic Game Algorithm (UCSG)
3We write, “with high probability, g = O˜(f)” or “w.h.p., g = O˜(f)” to indicate “with probability ≥
1− δ, g = f1O(f) + f2”, where f1, f2 are some polynomials of logD, log S, logA, log T, log(1/δ).
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Algorithm 1 UCSG
Input: S, A = A1 ×A2, T .
Initialization: t = 1.
for phase k = 1, 2, ... do
tk = t.
1. Initialize phase k: vk(s, a) = 0, nk(s, a) = max
{
1,
∑tk−1
τ=1 1(sτ ,aτ )=(s,a)
}
,
nk(s, a, s
′) =
∑tk−1
τ=1 1(sτ ,aτ ,sτ+1)=(s,a,s′), pˆk(s
′|s, a) = nk(s,a,s′)nk(s,a) , ∀s, a, s′.
2. Update the confidence set: Mk = {M˜ : ∀s, a, p˜(·|s, a) ∈ Pk(s, a)}, where
Pk(s, a) := CONF1(pˆk(·|s, a), nk(s, a)) ∩ CONF2(pˆk(·|s, a), nk(s, a)).
3. Optimistic planning:
(
M1k , pi
1
k
)
= MAXIMIN-EVI (Mk, γk) , where γk := 1/
√
tk.
4. Execute policies:
repeat
Draw a1t ∼ pi1k(·|st); observe the reward rt and the next state st+1.
Set vk(st, at) = vk(st, at) + 1 and t = t+ 1.
until ∃(s, a) such that vk(s, a) = nk(s, a)
end for
Definitions of confidence regions:
CONF1(pˆ, n) :=
{
p˜ ∈ [0, 1]S : ‖p˜− pˆ‖1 ≤
√
2S ln(1/δ1)
n
}
, δ1 =
δ
2S2A log2 T
.
CONF2(pˆ, n) :=
{
p˜ ∈ [0, 1]S : ∀i, ∣∣√p˜i(1− p˜i)−√pˆi(1− pˆi)∣∣ ≤√ 2 ln(6/δ1)n−1 ,
|p˜i − pˆi| ≤ min
(√
ln(6/δ1)
2n ,
√
2pˆi(1−pˆi)
n ln
6
δ1
+ 73(n−1) ln
6
δ1
)}
.
The Upper Confidence Stochastic Game algorithm (UCSG) (Algorithm 1) extends UCRL2 [19],
using the optimism principle to balance exploitation and exploration. It proceeds in phases (indexed
by k), and only changes the learner’s policy pi1k at the beginning of each phase. The length of each
phase is not fixed a priori, but depends on the statistics of past observations.
In the beginning of each phase k, the algorithm estimates the transition probabilities using empirical
frequencies pˆk(·|s, a) observed in previous phases (Step 1). With these empirical frequencies, it can
then create a confidence region Pk(s, a) for each transition probability. The transition probabilities
lying in the confidence regions constitute a set of plausible stochastic game modelsMk, where the
true model M belongs to with high probability (Step 2). Then, Player 1 optimistically picks one
modelM1k fromMk, and finds the optimal (stationary) policy pi1k under this model (Step 3). Finally,
Player 1 executes the policy pi1k for a while until some (s, a)-pair’s number of occurrences is doubled
during this phase (Step 4). The count vk(s, a) records the number of steps the (s, a)-pair is observed
in phase k; it is reset to zero in the beginning of every phase.
In Step 3, to pick an optimistic model and a policy is to pickM1k ∈Mk and pi1k ∈ ΠSR such that ∀s,
min
π2
ρ(M1k , pi
1
k, pi
2, s) ≥ max
M˜∈Mk
ρ∗(M˜, s)− γk. (2)
where γk denotes the error parameter for MAXIMIN-EVI. The LHS of (2) is well-defined because
Player 2 has stationary optimal policy under the MDP induced by M1k and pi
1
k. Roughly speaking,
(2) says that min
π2
ρ(M1k , pi
1
k, pi
2, s) should approximate max
M˜∈Mk,π1
min
π2
ρ(M˜, pi1, pi2, s) by an error
no more than γk. That is, (M
1
k , pi
1
k) are picked optimistically in Mk × ΠSR considering the most
adversarial opponent.
4.1 Extended SG and Maximin-EVI
The calculation ofM1k and pi
1
k involves the technique of Extended Value Iteration (EVI), which also
appears in [19] as a one-player version.
Consider the following SG, namedM+. Let the state space S and Player 2’s action spaceA2 remain
the same as inM . Let A1+, p+(·|·, ·, ·), r+(·, ·, ·) be Player 1’s action set, the transition kernel, and
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the reward function of M+, such that for any a1 ∈ A1 and a2 ∈ A2 and an admissible transition
probability p˜(·|s, a1, a2) ∈ Pk(s, a1, a2), there is an action a1+ ∈ A1+ such that p+(·|s, a1+, a2) =
p˜(·|s, a1, a2) and r+(s, a1+, a2) = r(s, a1, a2). In other words, Player 1 selecting an action in A1+
is equivalent to selecting an action in A1 and simultaneously selecting an admissible transition
probability in the confidence region Pk(·, ·).
Suppose that M ∈ Mk, then the extended SG M+ satisfies Assumption 2 because the true model
M is embedded in M+. By Theorem E.1 in Appendix E, it has a constant game value ρ∗(M+)
independent of the initial state, and satisfies Bellman equation of the form val{r+Pf} = ρ · e+ f ,
for some bounded function f(·), where e stands for the all-one constant vector. With the above
conditions, we can use value iteration with Schweitzer transform (a.k.a. aperiodic transform)[34]
to solve the optimal policy in the extended EG M+. We call it MAXIMIN-EVI. For the details
of MAXIMIN-EVI, please refer to Appendix F. We only summarize the result with the following
Lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose the true modelM ∈Mk, then the estimated modelM1k and stationary policy
pi1k output by MAXIMIN-EVI in Step 3 satisfy
∀s, min
π2
ρ(M1k , pi
1
k, pi
2, s) ≥ max
π1
min
π2
ρ(M,pi1, pi2, s)− γk.
Before diving into the analysis under the two assumptions, we first establish the following fact.
Lemma 4.2. With high probability, the true modelM ∈Mk for all phases k.
It is proved in Appendix D. With Lemma 4.2, we can fairly assume M ∈ Mk in most of our
analysis.
5 Analysis under Assumption 1
In this section, we import analysis techniques from one-playerMDPs [2, 19, 22, 9]. We also develop
some techniques that deal with non-stationary opponents.
We model Player 2’s behavior in the most general way, i.e., assuming it using a history-dependent
randomized policy. Let Ht = (s1, a1, r1, ..., st−1, at−1, rt−1, st) ∈ Ht be the history up to st, then
we assume pi2t to be a mapping from Ht to a distribution over A2. We will simply write pi2t (·) and
hide its dependency on Ht inside the subscript t. A similar definition applies to pi
1
t (·). With abuse
of notations, we denote by k(t) the phase where step t lies in, and thus our algorithm uses policy
pi1t (·) = pi1k(t)(·|st). The notations pi1t and pi1k are used interchangeably. Let Tk := tk+1 − tk be the
length of phase k. We decompose the regret in phase k in the following way:
Λk := Tkρ
∗(M)−
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
r(st, at) =
4∑
n=1
Λ
(n)
k , (3)
in which we define
Λ
(1)
k = Tk
(
ρ∗(M)−min
π2
ρ(M1k , pi
1
k, pi
2, stk)
)
,
Λ
(2)
k = Tk
(
min
π2
ρ(M1k , pi
1
k, pi
2, stk)− ρ(M1k , pi1k, p¯i2k, stk)
)
,
Λ
(3)
k = Tk
(
ρ(M1k , pi
1
k, p¯i
2
k, stk)− ρ(M,pi1k, p¯i2k)
)
,
Λ
(4)
k = Tkρ(M,pi
1
k, p¯i
2
k)−
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
r(st, at),
where p¯i2k is some stationary policy of Player 2 which will be defined later. Since the actions of
Player 2 are arbitrary, p¯i2k is imaginary and only exists in analysis. Note that under Assumption 1,
any stationary policy pair overM induces an irreducible Markov chain, so we do not need to specify
the initial states for ρ(M,pi1k, p¯i
2
k) in (3). Among the four terms, Λ
(2)
k is clearly non-positive, and
Λ
(1)
k , by optimism, can be bounded using Lemma 4.1. Now remains to bound Λ
(3)
k and Λ
(4)
k .
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5.1 Bounding
∑
k Λ
(3)
k and
∑
k Λ
(4)
k
The Introduction of p¯i2k. Λ
(3)
k and Λ
(4)
k involve the artificial policy p¯i
2
k, which is a stationary policy
that replaces Player 2’s non-stationary policy in the analysis. This replacement costs some constant
regret but facilitates the use of perturbation analysis in regret bounding. The selection of p¯i2k is based
on the principle that the behavior (e.g., total number of visits to some (s, a)) of the Markov chain
induced byM,pi1k, p¯i
2
k should be close to the empirical statistics. Intuitively, p¯i
2
k can be defined as
p¯i2k(a
2|s) :=
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
1st=spi
2
t (a
2)∑tk+1−1
t=tk
1st=s
. (4)
Note two things, however. First, since we need the actual trajectory in defining this policy, it can
only be defined after phase k has ended. Second, p¯i2k can be undefined because the denominator of
(4) can be zero. However, this will not happen in too many steps. Actually, we have
Lemma 5.1.
∑
k Tk1{p¯i2k not well-defined}≤ O˜(DS2A) with high probability.
Before describing how we bound the regret with the help of p¯i2k and the perturbation analysis, we
establish the following lemma:
Lemma 5.2. We say the transition probability at time step t is ε-accurate if |p1k(s′|st, pit) −
p(s′|st, pit)| ≤ ε ∀s′ where p1k denotes the transition kernel ofM1k . We letBt(ε) = 1 if the transition
probability at time t is ε-accurate; otherwise Bt(ε) = 0. Then for any state s, with high probability,∑T
t=1 1st=s1Bt(ε)=0 ≤ O˜
(
A/ε2
)
.
Now we are able to sketch the logic behind our proofs. Let’s assume that p¯i2k models pi
2
k quite
well, i.e., the expected frequency of every state-action pair induced by M,pi1k, p¯i
2
k is close to the
empirical frequency induced by M,pi1k, pi
2
k. Then clearly, Λ
(4)
k is close to zero in expectation. The
term Λ
(3)
k now becomes the difference of average reward between two Markov reward processes
with slightly different transition probabilities. This term has a counterpart in [19] as a single-player
version. Using similar analysis, we can prove that the dominant term of Λ
(3)
k is proportional to
sp(h(M1k , pi
1
k, p¯i
2
k, ·)). In the single-player case, [19] can directly claim that sp(h(M1k , pi1k, ·)) ≤ D
(see their Remark 8), but unfortunately, this is not the case in the two-player version. 4
To continue, we resort to the perturbation analysis for the mean first passage times (developed in Ap-
pendix C). Lemma 5.2 shows thatM1k will not be far fromM for too many steps. Then TheoremC.9
in Appendix C tells that ifM1k are close enough toM , T
π1k,π¯
2
k(M1k ) can be bounded by 2T
π1k,π¯
2
k(M).
As RemarkM.1 implies that sp(h(M1k , pi
1
k, p¯i
2
k, ·)) ≤ T π
1
k,π¯
2
k(M1k ) and Assumption 1 guarantees that
T π
1
k,π¯
2
k(M) ≤ D, we have sp(h(M1k , pi1k, p¯i2k, ·)) ≤ T π
1
k,π¯
2
k(M1k ) ≤ 2T π
1
k,π¯
2
k(M) ≤ 2D.
The above approach leads to Lemma 5.3, which is a key in our analysis. We first define some
notations. Under Assumption 1, any pair of stationary policies induces an irreducible Markov chain,
which has a unique stationary distribution. If the policy pair pi = (pi1, pi2) is executed, we denote its
stationary distribution by µ(M,pi1, pi2, ·) = µ(M,pi, ·). Besides, denote vk(s) :=
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
1st=s.
We say a phase k is benign if the following hold true: the true model M lies in Mk, p¯i2k is well-
defined, sp(h(M1k , pi
1
k, p¯i
2
k, ·)) ≤ 2D, and µ(M,pi1k, p¯i2k, s) ≤ 2vk(s)Tk ∀s. We can show the following:
Lemma 5.3.
∑
k Tk1{phase k is not benign} ≤O˜(D3S5A) with high probability.
Finally, for benign phases, we can have the following two lemmas.
Lemma 5.4.
∑
k Λ
(4)
k 1{p¯i2k is well-defined }≤ O˜(D
√
ST +DSA) with high probability.
4The argument in [19] is simple: suppose that h(M1k , pi
1
k, s)− h(M
1
k , pi
1
k, s
′) > D, by the communicating
assumption, there is a path from s′ to s with expected time no more than D. Thus a policy that first goes
from s′ to s within D steps and then executes pi1k will outperform pi
1
k at s
′. This leads to a contradiction. In
two-player SGs, with a similar argument, we can also show that sp(h(M1k , pi
1
k, pi
2∗
k , ·)) ≤ D, where pi
2∗
k is the
best response to pi1k underM
1
k . However, since Player 2 is uncontrollable, his/her policy pi
2
k (or p¯i
2
k) can be quite
different from pi2∗k , and thus sp(h(M
1
k , pi
1
k, p¯i
2
k, ·)) ≤ D does not necessarily hold true.
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Lemma 5.5.
∑
k Λ
(3)
k 1{phase k is benign} ≤O˜(DS
√
AT +DS2A) with high probability,
Proof of Theorem 3.1. The regret proof starts from the decomposition of (3). Λ
(1)
k is bounded with
the help of Lemma 4.1:
∑
k Λ
(1)
k ≤
∑
k Tk/
√
tk = O(
√
T ).
∑
k Λ
(2)
k ≤ 0 by definition. Then with
Lemma 5.1, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5, we can bound Λ
(3)
k and Λ
(4)
k by O˜(D3S5A+DS
√
AT ).
6 Analysis under Assumption 2
In Section 5, the main ingredient of regret analysis lies in bounding the span of the bias vector,
sp(h(M1k , pi
1
k, p¯i
2
k, ·)). However, the same approach does not work because under the weaker As-
sumption 2, we do not have a bound on the mean first passage time under arbitrary policy pairs.
Hence we adopt the approach of approximating the average reward SG problem by a sequence of
finite-horizon SGs: on a high level, first, with the help of Assumption 2, we approximate the T
multiple of the original average-reward SG game value (i.e. the total reward in hindsight) with the
sum of those of H-step episodic SGs; second, we resort to [9]’s results to bound the H-step SGs’
sample complexity and translates it to regret.
Approximation by repeated episodic SGs. For the approximation, the quantityH does not appear
in UCSG but only in the analysis. The horizon T is divided into episodes each with lengthH . Index
episodes with i = 1, ..., T/H , and denote episode i’s first time step by τi. We say i ∈ ph(k) if allH
steps of episode i lie in phase k. Define theH-step expected reward under joint policy pi with initial
state s as VH(M,pi, s) := E
[∑H
t=1 rt|at ∼ pi, s1 = s
]
. Now we decompose the regret in phase k
as
∆k := Tkρ
∗ −
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
r(st, at) ≤
6∑
n=1
∆
(n)
k , (5)
where
∆
(1)
k =
∑
i∈ph(k)H
(
ρ∗ −minπ2 ρ(M1k , pi1k, pi2, sτi)
)
,
∆
(2)
k =
∑
i∈ph(k)
(
H minπ2 ρ(M
1
k , pi
1
k, pi
2, sτi)−minπ2 VH(M1k , pi1k, pi2, sτi)
)
,
∆
(3)
k =
∑
i∈ph(k)
(
minπ2 VH(M
1
k , pi
1
k, pi
2, sτi)− VH(M1k , pi1k, pi2i , sτi)
)
,
∆
(4)
k =
∑
i∈ph(k)
(
VH(M
1
k , pi
1
k, pi
2
i , sτi)− VH(M,pi1k, pi2i , sτi)
)
,
∆
(5)
k =
∑
i∈ph(k)
(
VH(M,pi
1
k, pi
2
i , sτi)−
∑τi+1−1
t=τi
r(st, at)
)
, ∆
(6)
k = 2H.
Here, pi2i denotes Player 2’s policy in episode i, which may be non-stationary. ∆
(6)
k comes from the
possible two incomplete episodes in phase k. ∆
(1)
k is related to the tolerance level we set for the
MAXIMIN-EVI algorithm: ∆
(1)
k ≤ Tkγk = Tk/
√
tk. ∆
(2)
k is an error caused by approximating an
infinite-horizon SG by a repeated episodicH-step SG (with possibly different initial states). ∆
(3)
k is
clearly non-positive. It remains to bound∆
(2)
k ,∆
(4)
k and∆
(5)
k .
Lemma 6.1. By Azuma-Hoeffding’s inequality,
∑
k∆
(5)
k ≤ O˜(
√
HT ) with high probability.
Lemma 6.2. Under Assumption 2,
∑
k∆
(2)
k ≤ TD/H +
∑
k Tkγk.
From sample complexity to regret bound. As the main contributor of regret,∆
(4)
k corresponds
to the inaccuracy in the transition probability estimation. Here we largely reuse [9]’s results where
they consider one-player episodic MDP with a fixed initial state distribution. Their main lemma
states that the number of episodes in phases such that |VH(M1k , pik, s0) − VH(M,pik, s0)| > ε
will not exceed O˜ (H2S2A/ε2), where s0 is their initial state in each episode. In other words,∑
k
Tk
H 1{|VH(M1k , pik, s0)− VH(M,pik, s0)| > ε} = O˜(H2S2A/ε2). Note that their proof allows
pik to be an arbitrarily selected non-stationary policy for phase k.
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We can directly utilize their analysis and we summarize it as Theorem K.1 in the appendix. While
their algorithm has an input ε, this input can be removed without affecting bounds. This means that
the PAC bounds holds for arbitrarily selected ε. With the help of Theorem K.1, we have
Lemma 6.3.
∑
k∆
(4)
k ≤ O˜(S
√
HAT +HS2A) with high probability.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. With the decomposition (5) and the help of Lemma 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3,
the regret is bounded by O˜(TDH + S
√
HAT + S2AH) = O˜( 3
√
DS2AT 2) by selecting H =
max{D, 3
√
D2T/(S2A)}.
7 Sample Complexity of Offline Training
In Section 3.1, we defined Lε to be the sample complexity of Player 1’s maximin policy. In our
offline version of UCSG, in each phase k we let both players each select their own optimistic policy.
After Player 1 has optimistically selected pi1k, Player 2 then optimistically selects his policy pi
2
k based
on the known pi1k. Specifically, the model-policy pair
(
M2k , pi
2
k
)
is obtained by another extended
value iteration on the extended MDP under fixed pi1k, where Player 2’s action set is extended. By
setting the stopping threshold also as γk, we have
ρ(M2k , pi
1
k, pi
2
k, s) ≤ min
M˜∈Mk
min
π2
ρ(M˜, pi1k, pi
2, s) + γk (6)
when value iteration halts. With this selection rule, we are able to obtain the following theorems.
Theorem 7.1. Under Assumption 1, UCSG achieves Lε = O˜(D3S5A+D2S2A/ε2) w.h.p.
Theorem 7.2. Let Assumption 2 hold, and further assume thatmax
s,s′
max
π1∈ΠSR
min
π2∈ΠSR
T π
1,π2
s→s′ (M) ≤ D.
Then UCSG achieves Lε = O˜(DS2A/ε3) w.h.p.
The algorithm can output a single stationary policy for Player 1 with the following guarantee: if
we run the offline version of UCSG for T > Lε steps, the algorithm can output a single stationary
policy that is ε-optimal. We show how to output this policy in the proofs of Theorem 7.1 and 7.2.
8 Open Problems
In this work, we obtain the regret of O˜(D3S5A + DS√AT ) and O˜( 3
√
DS2AT ) under different
mixing assumptions. A natural open problem is how to improve these bounds on both asymptotic
and constant terms. A lower bound of them can be inherited from the one-playerMDP setting, which
is Ω(
√
DSAT ) [19].
Another open problem is that if we further weaken the assumptions to
maxs,s′ minπ1 minπ2 T
π1,π2
s→s′ ≤ D, can we still learn the SG? We have argued that if we
only have this assumption, in general we cannot get sublinear regret in the online setting. However,
it is still possible to obtain polynomial-time offline sample complexity if the two players cooperate
to explore the state-action space.
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A Previous Bounds for MDPs and SGs
The techniques we use in this paper are most related to the probably approximately correct (PAC)
analysis for RL algorithms. Some rather complete reviews of the related works are provided in
[19, 9]. [19] considers the average-reward MDP that is communicating with bounded diameter D
(i.e.,maxs,s′ minπ T
π
s→s′(M) ≤ D, where T πs→s′(M) is defined as the expected time to reach from
state s to state s′ under model M and policy pi). Their UCRL2 algorithm achieves O˜(DS√AT )
regret upper bound, while still having a gap with the Ω(
√
DSAT ) lower bound. These bounds
translate to O˜
(
D2S2A
ε2
)
andΩ
(
DSA
ε2
)
sample complexity. The additionalD dependency is resolved
by [22, 9], though in discounted and episodic settings respectively. These two works leverage the
Bellman equation for local variance and obtained sample complexity bounds of order O˜
(
S2A
ε2(1−γ)3
)
and O˜
(
H2S2A
ε2
)
(γ: discount factor, H : fixed horizon length), making their gaps with the lower
bounds Ω
(
SA
ε2(1−γ)3
)
and Ω
(
H2SA
ε2
)
remain only an order of S.
The scenario that most resembles ours in the literature is that considered in [5], who proposed the
algorithm R-MAX. R-MAX is an optimism-based algorithm that can be used to learn stochastic
games with arbitrary opponents. However, the algorithm depends on a parameter ε and the ε-return
mixing time Tε that need to be known in advance. This ε-return mixing time resembles our
D
ε in As-
sumption 2. As a result, their O˜
(
T 3ε S
2A
ε3
)
translates to O˜
(
D3S2A
ε6
)
, while our bound is O˜
(
DS2A
ε3
)
.
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Another difference lies in that the output policy of our algorithm is a stationary one, rather than a
Tε-step non-stationary policy as in R-MAX.
B Inequalities
Lemma B.1. (Azuma-Hoeffding’s inequality. Theorem 4.2 of [6]) LetF1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ FT be a filtration,
and Y1, · · · , YT real random variables such that Yt is Ft-measurable, E(Yt|Ft−1) = 0 and Yt ∈
[At, At + ct] where At is a random variable Ft−1-measurable and ct is a positive constant. Then
with probability at least 1− δ,
T∑
t=1
Yt <
√√√√ log(δ−1)
2
T∑
t=1
c2t .
Lemma B.2. (Bernstein inequality. Lemma 4.4 of [6]) Let F1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ FT be a filtration, and
Y1, · · · , YT real random variables such that Yt is Ft-measurable,E(Yt|Ft−1) = 0 and |Yt| ≤ b for
some b > 0. Let VT =
∑T
t=1E(Y
2
t |Ft−1) and δ > 0. Then with probability at least 1− δ,
T∑
t=1
Yt ≤ 2
√
VT log(Tδ−1) +
√
5b log(Tδ−1).
C Perturbation Bounds for Markov Chains
Perturbation analysis for Markov chains plays an important role in analyzing reinforcement learning
algorithms (e.g., [2]). Those analyses mainly center around the question that when the transition
probabilities of a Markov chain are perturbed by a little, how much stationary distributions or mean
first passage times (as defined in Definition C.1) will change. While in [2], the perturbation bound
for stationary distributions is used, we further use that of the mean first passage time to get a tighter
regret bound.
In this section, we use i, j to index states, and use µi to denote the stationary distribution of state i
in an irreducible Markov chain.
Definition C.1 (Mean first passage time). In a Markov chain, we define Tij to be the expected time
to reach state j starting from state i. In the case i = j, Tii is the expected time to return to state i
when starting from i. Thus Tij ≥ 1 always holds whether i = j or not.
C.1 Perturbation Bounds for Stationary Distribution
Theorem C.2 (Proposition 2.2 of [7]). Let C and C˜ be two irreducible Markov chains with the
same state space S. Let their transition matrices be P , P˜ , and stationary distributions be µ, µ˜. Let
E = P˜ − P and use ‖·‖∞ to represent the largest absolute value in a matrix, then ∀j,
|µ˜j − µj | ≤ µj S ‖E‖∞
2
max
i6=j
Tij . (7)
With a little modification on the proof of Theorem C.2, we can actually have the following lemma,
which only requires that C be an irreducible Markov chain.
Theorem C.3. Let C be an irreducible Markov chain, and C˜ be some Markov chain with the same
state space S as C. Let their transition matrices be P , P˜ , and let C’s stationary distributions be
µ. Let E = P˜ − P . If ‖E‖∞ < 2/(Smaxi6=j Tij), then C˜ is also an irreducible Markov chain;
furthermore, the stationary distribution of C˜, µ˜, satisfies ∀j,
|µ˜j − µj | ≤ µj S ‖E‖∞
2
max
i6=j
Tij . (8)
Proof. Let P ∗ and P˜ ∗ be the Cesaro limits of P and P˜ , which is defined by P ∗ =
limT→∞
1
T
∑T
t=1 P
t−1. Then we have
P ∗(I − P ) = 0, P˜ ∗(I − P˜ ) = P˜ ∗(I − P − E) = 0,
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and thus (P˜ ∗ − P ∗)(I − P ) = P˜ ∗E. If P˜ induces an irreducible Markov chain, P˜ ∗ will have
all identical rows and all positive elements. Suppose not, we can still extract its k-th row, which
corresponds to the stationary distribution when starting from state k. Let this k-th row’s j-th element
be µ˜kj . We can write (µ˜
k
j −µj)(I −P ) = µ˜kjE. Then following the same proof as in [7] or by [16]’s
Theorem 2.1, we still have
|µ˜kj − µj | ≤ µj
S ‖E‖∞
2
max
i6=j
Tij
Now since ‖E‖∞ ≤ 2/(Smaxi6=j Tij) and µj > 0 ∀j, we have µ˜kj > 0 ∀j, k. This means that every
state is recurrent and reachable from each other, implying that P˜ induces an irreducible Markov
chain.
C.2 Perturbation Bounds for Mean First Passage Time
The main result of this subsection is stated in Theorem C.9. It is developed with the help of Theorem
C.5 to Theorem C.8.
Definition C.4 (g-inverse, Definition 3.1 of [15]). A g-inverse of a matrix A is any matrix G such
that AGA = A.
Theorem C.5 (Theorem 5.3 of [16]). Let C be an irreducible Markov chain with stochastic matrix
P . Let Tij be the first passage time from state i to state j, and let G be any g-inverse of I − P . We
have
µjTij = Gjj −Gij + δij + µj
n∑
k=1
(Gik −Gjk).
The below theorem introduces a special g-inverse that is convenient for our use.
Theorem C.6 (Theorem 3.3 of [15]). Let P be a stochastic matrix of an irreducible Markov chain.
Let p⊤n denote the n-th row of P , and en denote the unit column vector with n-th component being
1. Then I − P + enp⊤n is non-singular, andG = (I − P + enp⊤n )−1 is a g-inverse of I − P .
Theorem C.7 (Section 5 of [16]). Let P˜ be a stochastic matrix of an irreducible Markov chain
perturbed from another stochastic matrix P of an irreducible Markov chain. Suppose that the per-
turbation only occurs at the n-th row of P (i.e. p⊤i = p˜
⊤
i ∀i 6= n). Define G as that in Theorem C.6.
Then G = G˜.
Suppose that the perturbation only occurs at the n-th row, and let G = (I − P + enp⊤n )−1. Then
Theorem C.5 and C.7 together imply that for i 6= j,
T˜ij = Tij + (Gij −Gjj)
(
1
µj
− 1
µ˜j
)
, (9)
with Tjj = 1/µj and T˜jj = 1/µ˜j (Corollary 5.3.1 of [16]). Here we see that T˜in = Tin, ∀i.
Lemma C.8. Let P be the stochastic matrix of an irreducible Markov chain, and let G = (I −
P + enp
⊤
n )
−1. If all mean first passage times are bounded by D′ (i.e., Tij ≤ D′ ∀i, j), then
|Gij −Gjj | ≤ 2µjD′ ∀i, j.
Proof. We first verify that
G =
[
(I − Pn)−1 e
0 1
]
, (10)
where Pn is obtained by deleting the n-th row and n-th column of P (without loss of generality,
assume that the n-th row is last row of G).
Directly expanding I − P + enp⊤n , we get
I − P + enp⊤n =
[
(I − Pn) d
0 1
]
,
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where d = (−p1,n,−p2,n, ...,−pn−1,n)⊤. To verify that (I − P + enp⊤n )−1 takes the form of (10),
one only needs to verify that (I − Pn)e + d = 0. This can be seen by (I − Pn)e = e − Pne =
(1, ..., 1)− (∑n−1i=1 p1,i, ...,∑n−1i=1 pn−1,i) = −d.
For i 6= n, from G’s expression in (10), we have
n∑
k=1
Gik = e
⊤
i Ge = e
⊤
i (I − Pn)−1e+ 1. (11)
Note that the dimension of ei and e are n in the second expression of (11), while are n − 1 in the
third expression. By [7]’s Equation (2.3), e⊤i (I−Pn)−1e = Tin. One can also see this by observing
that (I −Pn)−1 = I +Pn+P 2n + · · · , and e⊤i Pmn ej is “the probability of staying at j afterm steps
from i, while not visiting n in any of the m steps”. Summing e⊤i P
m
n ej over j and m, the physical
meaning becomes the mean first passage time from i to n, and the mathematical expression becomes
e⊤i (I − Pn)−1e. Thus, |
∑n
k=1(Gik − Gjk)| = |Tin − Tjn| ≤ maxij Tij ≤ D′. By Theorem C.5,
whenever i 6= j,
|Gij −Gjj | =
∣∣∣µjTij − µj n∑
k=1
(Gik −Gjk)
∣∣∣ ≤ µjTij + µjD′ ≤ 2µjD′.
We now combine (9) with (8) and Lemma C.8. Assuming that Tij ≤ D′, we have for i 6= j,
|T˜ij − Tij |= |Gij −Gjj | |µ˜j − µj |
µj µ˜j
≤ µj
µ˜j
‖E‖∞ SD′2. (12)
With (8) and (12) available, we now consider a general perturbation, which can actually be decom-
posed as S single-row perturbations.
Theorem C.9. Let P , P˜ be the original and the perturbed stochastic matrices, and let {Tij}, {T˜ij}
be their corresponding mean first passage times. If maxij Tij ≤ D and ‖E‖∞ =
∥∥∥P˜ − P∥∥∥
∞
≤
1
8DS2 , thenmaxij T˜ij ≤ 2D.
Proof. We do this general perturbation of P by perturbing one row at a time. This procedure will
repeat for S times.
Suppose that the original stationary distribution and first passage times are denoted by µ
(0)
i and T
(0)
ij ,
and that those after n-th perturbation are denoted by µ˜
(n)
i and T˜
(n)
ij .
Suppose that T
(0)
ij ≤ D ∀i, j and µ(0)j ≥ 1D ∀j. Set ‖E‖∞ ≤ 18S2D . We prove the following facts
by induction:
T˜
(n)
ij ≤ D
(
1 +
n
S
)
, (13)
µ˜
(n)
j ∈
[
µ˜
(0)
j
(
1− 1
8S
)n
, µ˜
(0)
j
(
1 +
1
8S
)n]
, (14)
for n = 1, ..., S. Since n ≤ S, these induction hypotheses implicitly imply that
T˜
(n)
ij ≤ 2D, (15)
µ˜
(n)
j ≥ µ˜(0)j
(
1− 1
8S
)S
≥ 1
2D
, (16)
because (1 − 1/(8S))S ≥ 1/2 for all S ≥ 1. Now we start the induction. The base case
for n = 0 clearly holds. Suppose that (13)-(14) hold for all n ≤ k. Then by (8) we have
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∣∣∣µ˜(k)j − µ˜(k+1)j ∣∣∣ ≤ µ˜(k)j 18S , so µ˜(k+1)j ≥ µ˜(k)j (1− 18S ) ≥ µ˜(0)j (1− 18S )(k+1), and µ˜(k+1)j ≤
µ˜
(k)
j
(
1 + 18S
) ≤ µ˜(0)j (1 + 18S )(k+1). On the other hand, by (12), for i 6= j, we have T˜ (k+1)ij −
T˜
(k)
ij ≤
µ˜
(k)
j
µ˜
(k+1)
j
‖E‖∞ (2D)2 ≤ 11− 18S
1
8S2DS(2D)
2 ≤ DS , so T˜
(k+1)
ij ≤ T˜ (k)ij + DS ≤ D
(
1 + k+1S
)
.
In the case i = j, we have T˜
(k+1)
jj − T˜ (k)jj = 1µ˜(k+1)
j
− 1
µ˜
(k)
j
≤ (1+
1
8S )−1
µ˜
(k)
j
≤ 2D8S ≤ DS .
D Lemmas for Failing Events
Lemma D.1 (Proposition 18 of [19]). The number of phases is upper bounded by Umax =
SA log2 T .
Proof. Since phase changes only occur when the sample count of some (s, a1, a2) is doubled, those
changes corresponding to a specific (s, a1, a2) is upper bounded by log2 T . Considering all states
and actions, the total number of phase changes is upper bounded by SA log2 T .
Lemma D.2 (Lemma 17 of [19]). For some specific k, s and a, the event p(·|s, a) ∈
CONF1(pˆk(·|s, a), nk(s, a)) holds with probability at least 1− δ1.
Proof. Please refer to [19].
Lemma D.3 (Lemma 1 of [9], Theorem 10 and 11 of [25]). For some specific k, s and a, the event
p(·|s, a) ∈ CONF2(pˆk(·|s, a), nk(s, a)) holds with probability at least 1− Sδ1.
Proof. Please refer to [9] or [25].
Proof of Lemma 4.2. By LemmaD.1, there are at mostSA log2 T confidence set updates to consider.
Each update involves only a specific pˆ(·|s, a) (totally S entries). By Lemma D.2, D.3 and using the
union bound, the eventM ∈ Mk∀k holds with probability at least 1 − SA log2 T × (δ1 + Sδ1) ≥
1− δ.
E Lemmas for Stationary Optimal Policies
Theorem E.1. Given a stochastic game M = (S,A, r, p), where S is countable, A = A1 × A2
a compact metric space and both r(s, ·) ∈ [0, 1] and p(s′|s, ·) are continuous in a = (a1, a2).
Suppose Assumption 2 holds for M . Then there exist maximin stationary policies pi∗ = (pi1∗, pi2∗)
for the two-player zero-sum stochastic game, the maximin stationary policies attain the game value
ρ∗, which is independent of the initial state, and there is a bounded function h(·) which together
with ρ∗ satisfies the following Bellman equation. That is, for all state s,
ρ∗ + h(s) = max
π1∈ΠSR
{
r(s, pi1, pi2∗) +
∑
s′
p(s′|s, pi1, pi2∗)h(s′)
}
ρ∗ + h(s) = min
π2∈ΠSR
{
r(s, pi1∗, pi2) +
∑
s′
p(s′|s, pi1∗, pi2)h(s′)
}
.
To prove this, we use the following lemma which connects the boundedness of mean first passage
times with the uniform boundedness of sp(V ∗α (·)) for all discount factor 0 < α < 1, where V ∗α (·)
is the discounted game value defined as V ∗α (s) = maxπ1 minπ2 E
π1,π2
[∑∞
t=1 α
t−1rt|s1 = s
]
. It
is known that for any discount factor 0 < α < 1, discounted SGs always have maximin stationary
policies piα = (pi
1
α, pi
2
α) which attain the game value V
∗
α (s) for all s. We next show that the span of
V ∗α is uniformly bounded byD under Assumption 2.
Lemma E.2. [14] Suppose given a stochastic gameM = (S,A, r, p), where 0 ≤ r(s, a1, a2) ≤ 1.
Suppose ∀s, s′ ∈ S and for any pi2 ∈ ΠSR for Player 2, there exists a pi1 ∈ ΠSR for Player 1 such
that the mean first passage time T π
1,π2
s,s′ ≤ D. Then we have |V ∗α (s)− V ∗α (s′)| ≤ D, ∀s, s′ ∈ S, for
all 0 < α < 1.
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Proof. Fix s, s′ ∈ S. Fix a discount factor 0 < α < 1. For a fixed pair of maximin sta-
tionary policies piα = (pi
1
α, pi
2
α) ∈ ΠSR × ΠSR, the discounted value function satisfies V ∗α (s) =
r(s, pi1α, pi
2
α) + α
∑
s′ p(s
′|s, pi1α, pi2α)V ∗α (s′). Since for any pi1 ∈ ΠSR, V ∗α (s) ≥ r(s, pi1, pi2α) +
α
∑
s′ p(s
′|s, pi1, pi2α)V ∗α (s′), thus recursively, for any time step T ≥ 1, we have
V ∗α (s) ≥ Eπ
1,π2α
s
[ T−1∑
t=1
αt−1rt + α
T−1V ∗α (sT )
]
,
where Eπ
1,π2
s [·] = Es [·|pi1, pi2] denote the expectation conditioned on initial state being s, and the
players executing the policy pair (pi1, pi2). Hence for any stopping time τ ,
V ∗α (s) ≥ Eπ
1,π2α
s
[ τ−1∑
t=1
αt−1rt + α
τ−1V ∗α (sτ )
]
.
In particular, by choosing τ as the hitting time of s′ from s,
V ∗α (s) ≥ Eπ
1,π2α
s
[ τ−1∑
t=1
αt−1rt
]
+ Es
[
ατ
∣∣∣pi1, pi2α]V ∗α (s′)
≥ αEs
[
τ
∣∣π1,π2α]V ∗α (s′) = αTpi1,pi2αs→s′ V ∗α (s′)
≥ V ∗α (s′)− (1− α)(T π
1,π2α
s→s′ )V
∗
α (s
′)
≥ V ∗α (s′)− T π
1,π2α
s→s′
≥ V ∗α (s′)−D.
For the first inequality we used Vα(sτ ) = Vα(s
′) and for the second, the non-negativity of r(s, a)
and Jensen’s inequality. The equality holds since the expected value of hitting time is the mean first
passage time T
π1,π2α
s→s′ . The third inequality is essentially α
x ≥ (α − 1)x + 1 for x ≥ 1; the fourth
(1 − α)Vα ≤ 1. For the last inequality we used the assumption that there exists some pi1 for which
T
π1,π2α
s→s′ ≤ D.
Lemma E.3. [12] Suppose |V ∗α (s) − V ∗α (s′)| is uniformly bounded for all 0 < α < 1 and for
any s, s′ ∈ S. Then there exist a pair of maximin stationary policies pi = (pi1∗, pi2∗) attaining the
game value ρ∗ which is independent of the initial state and a bounded function h(·) for which the
following equations hold. For all state s,
ρ∗ + h(s) = max
π1∈ΠSR
{
r(s, pi1, pi2∗) +
∑
s′
p(s′|s, pi1, pi2∗)h(s′)
}
,
ρ∗ + h(s) = min
π2∈ΠSR
{
r(s, pi1∗, pi2) +
∑
s′
p(s′|s, pi1∗, pi2)h(s′)
}
.
Proof. For any discount factor 0 < α < 1,
V ∗α (s) = max
π1
{r(s, pi1, pi2α) + α
∑
s′
p(s′|s, pi1, pi2α)V ∗α (s′)},
V ∗α (s) = min
π2
{r(s, pi1α, pi2) + α
∑
s′
p(s′|s, pi1α, pi2)V ∗α (s′)}.
Subtracting both sides by V ∗α (s1) for some fixed state s1, and defining vα(s) := V
∗
α (s) − V ∗α (s1),
we get, for all s,
vα(s) = max
π1
{r(s, pi1, pi2α)− (1− α)V ∗α (s1) + α
∑
s′
p(s′|s, pi1, pi2α)vα(s′)},
vα(s) = min
π2
{r(s, pi1α, pi2)− (1− α)V ∗α (s1) + α
∑
s′
p(s′|s, pi1α, pi2)vα(s′)}.
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Algorithm 2 Value Iteration with Schweitzer transform
Input: M = (S,A1 ×A2, r, p), 0 < γ < 1, 0 < α < 1.
Initialization: v0 ≡ 0.
repeat for i = 1, 2, ...
vi = (1− α) val
{
r + Pvi−1
}
+ αvi−1.
until sp (vi − vi−1) ≤ (1− α)γ.
Since −D ≤ vα(s) ≤ D, 0 ≤ (1 − α)V ∗α (s1) ≤ 1 and piiα ∈ ΠSR, (i = 1, 2), all of which are
contained in compact subsets/spaces, by using diagonalization argument and by Lebesgue conver-
gence theorem, we can obtain a sequence αk → 1, a bounded function h, and a constant ρ∗ such
that vαk(·)→ h(·), (1− αk)V ∗αk(s1)→ ρ∗, piiαk → pii∗, (i = 1, 2), and
αk
∑
s′
p(s′|s, pi1, pi2αk)vαk(s′)→
∑
s′
p(s′|s, pi1, pi2∗)h(s′),
αk
∑
s′
p(s′|s, pi1αk , pi2)vαk(s′)→
∑
s′
p(s′|s, pi1∗, pi2)h(s′),
as k →∞. Hence in the limit, for all state s,
ρ∗ + h(s) = max
π1∈ΠSR
{
r(s, pi1, pi2∗) +
∑
s′
p(s′|s, pi1, pi2∗)h(s′)
}
,
ρ∗ + h(s) = min
π2∈ΠSR
{
r(s, pi1∗, pi2) +
∑
s′
p(s′|s, pi1∗, pi2)h(s′)
}
.
F MAXIMIN-EVI and Its Convergence
As noted in Section 4.1, MAXIMIN-EVI proceeds simply by applying value iteration (Algorithm 2)
on M+. The output of the algorithm is a value vector with tolerable errors. The val{r + Pvi−1}
term in Algorithm 2 becomes
val
{
r(s, a1+, a2) +
∑
s′
p+(s′|s, a1+, a2)vi−1(s′))
}
=val
{
r(s, a1, a2) + max
p˜(·)∈Pk(s,a1,a2)
∑
s′
p˜(s′)vi−1(s
′))
}
. (17)
The inner maximization can be efficiently solved with linear programming. The
MAXIMIN-EVI(Mk, γk) in UCSG is then done by running Algorithm 2 with the evaluation
of (17) in every iteration.
The following three lemmas characterize the convergence of the algorithm, and the properties of its
outputs when converged. Lemma F.1 gaurantees that MAXIMIN-EVI converges. Lemma F.2 shows
that when the algorithm halts, the output policy’s worst-case average reward does not deviate from
the maximin reward by more than γ. Lemma F.3 shows that the output value vector has a span no
more thanD.
Lemma F.1 (Theorem 4 in [34]). Suppose that Assumption 2 holds for some SGM . Then perform-
ing Value Iteration with Schweitzer transform onM converges asymptotically.
Proof of Lemma F.1. If Assumption 2 holds, then the Bellman equation holds with an initial-state
independent game value by Theorem E.1. Then by Theorem 4 of [34], the value iteration with
Schweitzer transform converges.
Lemma F.2. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds for some stochastic game M . Let {vi} be the
value sequence in the Value Iteration algorithm. Let N be the index when iteration halts, i.e.,
sp(vN+1 − vN ) ≤ (1 − α)γ. Let pi1 := solve1 {r + PvN}. Then pi1 is γ-optimal in the sense
thatminπ2 ρ(M,pi
1.pi2) ≥ ρ∗(M)− γ.
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Proof of Lemma F.2. LetD = mins{vN+1(s)− vN (s)} and U = maxs{vN+1(s)− vN (s)}. Then
De+ vN ≤ vN+1 = (1− α) val{r + PvN}+ αvN ≤ (1− α)(rπ + PπvN ) + αvN ,
where pi = (pi1, pi2) for any pi2 ∈ ΠSR. Let P ∗π = limT→∞ 1T
∑T
t=1 P
t−1
π be the Cesaro limit of Pπ .
Applying it on both sides of the inequality, we get De ≤ (1 − α)P ∗π rπ = (1 − α)ρ(M,pi1, pi2, ·),
or D ≤ (1 − α)ρ(M,pi1, pi2, s), ∀s, pi2. Let pi∗ = (pi1∗, pi2∗) be the optimal policy pair and
ρ∗(M) be their maximin value, then D ≤ (1 − α)ρ(M,pi1, pi2∗, s) ≤ (1 − α)ρ∗(M). In a similar
way, one can prove that U ≥ (1 − α)ρ∗(M). Since we assume U − D ≤ (1 − α)γ, we have
D ≥ (1 − α)(ρ∗(M) − γ). Therefore, pi1 is γ-optimal in the sense that ∀pi2, ρ(M,pi1, pi2, s) ≥
ρ∗(M)− γ.
Lemma F.3. If Assumption 2 holds for some modelM , then value iteration procedure in Algorithm
2 will always produce value functions with spans bounded byD. That is,
sp (vi) ≤ D, ∀i.
Proof. Note that value iteration with Schweitzer transform is equivalent to the following procedure.
First modify the transition kernel and reward by pα(s
′|s, a1, a2) = (1 − α)p(s′|s, a1, a2) + αδs,s′
and rα(s, a
1, a2) = (1 − α)r(s, a1, a2) + α0; then do the normal value iteration by vi = val{rα +
Pαvi−1}. By the principle of dynamic programming, vi is the maximin expected reward in the i-step
game under the transformed model.
The transformed model is equivalent to the system where at each time step, the state remains same
as the previous one with probability α, and within that step there is no reward obtained/paid.
Clearly, in this new game, the advantage of starting from state s than starting from state s′ (which
can be calculated by vi(s)− vi(s′)) is no more than that in the original game. In the original game,
by a similar argument as Remark 8 in [19], this advantage difference is bounded by D. This then
implies the argument in the lemma.
G Proof of Lemma 5.2
Lemma 5.2 directly follows from Lemma G.1 and G.2.
In this proof, we borrow the technique used in [22] and [9] to bound the number of steps with
inaccurate transition probabilities (while they use this technique to bound the number of steps with
inaccurate game value). Note here again that pit(·) can represent any history-dependent policy, and
we hide its parameterHt = (s1, a1, r1, ..., st) inside the subscript of t.
Define the importance of a joint action a at time t as
ιt(a) := max
{
zj : zj ≤ pit(a)
wmin
}
,
and the its knownness as
κt(a) := max
{
zj : zj ≤
nk(t)(st, a)
mpit(a)
}
,
with z1 = 0, zj = 2
j−2 ∀j = 2, 3, ..., and some pre-defined wmin > 0, m > 0. Note that we
can always define them in hindsight even though the learner does not know pi2t . These two amounts
make partitions to the action set available at st. The partitioning is based on the actions’ probability
of being selected at time t (i.e., pit(a)), and the accuracy it has been estimated (the larger nk(t)(st, a),
the more accurate). Intuitively, the larger κt(a), the less likely will action a contribute to inaccurate
transition probability estimation. Define the partitions by Xt,κ,ι := {a : κt(a) = κ and ιt(a) =
ι}, ∀κ, ι.
If we let wmin =
ε
3
√
2 ln(1/δ)A
andm =
5 log22(T/wmin) ln(1/δ)
ε2 , with some 0 < ε < 1, we can prove
the following lemmas.
Lemma G.1. For any s, any κ and any ι > 0, with probability at least 1− δ,
T∑
t=1
1st=s1|Xt,κ,ι|>κ = O
(
A log22(T/wmin) ln(1/δ)
ε2
)
.
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Lemma G.2. If for all κ and all ι > 0 we have |Xt,κ,ι| ≤ κ, then for any plausible p˜ in the
confidence setMk(t), |p˜(s′|st, pit)− p(s′|st, pit)| ≤ ε for all s′.
G.1 Proof of Lemma G.1
We prove Lemma G.1 with the help of Lemma G.3 and G.4.
Lemma G.3. For any s, κ, and ι > 0,
∑T
t=1 1st=s1at∈Xt,κ,ι ≤ 6Am(κ+ 1)ιwmin.
Proof. First fix a. By the definition of importance, if a ∈ Xt,κ,ι, then ιwmin ≤ pit(a) < 2ιwmin.
In the case κ > 0, we also have mκpit(a) ≤ nk(t)(st, a) < 2mκpit(a). They two together imply
mκιwmin ≤ nk(t)(st, a) < 4mκιwmin. This last inequality says that any (s, a) cannot be sampled
in the partition (κ, ι) for more than about 3mκιwmin times. This is because when (s, a) is sampled
once (i.e., st = s, at = a), nk(t)(s, a) will be increased by one, and this cannot happen for more
than 4mκιwmin −mκιwmin times while (s, a) ∈ Xt,κ,ι. Since UCSG only updates nk(s, a) when
new phases start and doubling the sample count of a state-action triple incurs a phase change, we
use a more conservative bound of 6mκιwmin. That is, we have
T∑
t=1
1st=s1at=a1a∈Xt,κ,ι ≤ 6mκιwmin. (18)
In the case κ = 0, we have nk(t)(st, a) < mpit(a) < 2mιwmin. Thus similarly, the sample counts
of (s, a) in the partition (κ, ι) cannot exceed 4mιwmin. The cases of κ > 0 and κ = 0 can then be
combined into a single one:
T∑
t=1
1st=s1at=a1a∈Xt,κ,ι ≤ 6m(κ+ 1)ιwmin. (19)
Summing (19) over all actions leads to the statement in the lemma.
Now we sketch the argument of the next lemma. When ι > 0, each action in Xt,κ,ι are to be
sampled with probability no less than ιwmin. If furthermore |Xt,κ,ι| is large, the probability that
some a ∈ Xt,κ,ι is sampled will be also large. However by Lemma G.3, the total times elements in
partition (κ, ι) are sampled are upper bounded. Therefore, we can conclude that |Xt,κ,ι| cannot be
large for too many steps. Formally, we have
Lemma G.4. With probability at least 1− δ,
T∑
t=1
1st=s1at∈Xt,κ,ι ≥
1
2
(κ+ 1)ιwmin
T∑
t=1
1st=s1|Xt,κ,ι|>κ −
9
2
log(Tδ−1).
Proof. To prove Lemma G.4, we need the help of Lemma B.2.
Let Ft−1 = Ht = (s1, a1, r1 · · · , st−1, at−1, rt−1, st) and
Yt = qt − 1st=s1|Xt,κ,ι|>κ1at∈Xt,κ,ι ,
where we define
qt := 1st=s1|Xt,κ,ι|>κ Pr
{
at ∈ Xt,κ,ι
∣∣∣st = s, |Xt,κ,ι| > κ}.
Then Lemma B.2’s conditions are met with b = 1. Moreover,
VT =
T∑
t=1
qt(1− qt) ≤
T∑
t=1
qt.
Substituting them into Lemma B.2 and rearraging terms, we get that with probability≥ 1− δ,
T∑
t=1
1st=s1|Xt,κ,ι|>κ1at∈Xt,κ,ι ≥
(∑T
t=1 qt
)
− 2
√(∑T
t=1 qt
)
log(Tδ−1)−
√
5 log(Tδ−1).
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Solving the above inequality with respect to
√∑T
t=1 qt, we can bound with probability≥ 1− δ that
T∑
t=1
1st=s1|Xt,κ,ι|>κ1at∈Xt,κ,ι ≥
1
2
T∑
t=1
qt − 9
2
log(Tδ−1). (20)
Finally we look at qt. Since each action inXt,κ,ι are drawn at time t with probability at least ιwmin,
we have
qt ≥ 1st=s1|Xt,κ,ι|>κ
(∑
a∈Xt,κ,ι
ιwmin
)
≥ (κ+ 1)ιwmin1st=s1|Xt,κ,ι|>κ. (21)
Combining (20), (21), and noting that 1st=s1at∈Xt,κ,ι ≥ 1st=s1|Xt,κ,ι|>κ1at∈Xt,κ,ι concludes the
proof.
Proof of Lemma G.1. Combining Lemma G.3 and G.4, we have
T∑
t=1
1st=s1|Xt,κ,ι|>κ ≤ 12Am+
9
(κ+ 1)ιwmin
(22)
with probability no less than 1− δ. The lemma is then proved by substituting the selection ofm and
wmin into (22), and using κ+ 1 ≥ 1, ι ≥ 1.
G.2 Proof of Lemma G.2
Proof of Lemma G.2.
|p˜(s′|st, pit)− p(s′|st, pit)| ≤
∑
a
pit(a)|p˜(s′|st, a)− p(s′|st, a)|
≤
√
2 ln
1
δ1

 ∑
a:ιt(a)=0
√
pit(a)2
nk(t)(st, a)
+
∑
κ,ι:
ι>0
∑
a∈Xt,κ,ι
√
pit(a)2
nk(t)(st, a)


≤
√
2 ln
1
δ1

Awmin +∑
κ,ι:
ι>0
√√√√|Xt,κ,ι| ∑
a∈Xt,κ,ι
pit(a)2
nk(t)(st, a)


≤
√
2 ln
1
δ1

Awmin + ∑
κ,ι:
ι>0,κ>0
√√√√κ ∑
a∈Xt,κ,ι
pit(a)
mκ


≤
√
2 ln
1
δ1

Awmin +
√√√√|K × I| ∑
κ,ι:
ι>0,κ>0
∑
a∈Xt,κ,ι
pit(a)
m


≤
√
2 ln
1
δ1
(
Awmin +
√
|K × I|
m
)
,
whereK and I are the set of effective κ’s and ι’s in the above summation (only partitions with ι > 0
and κ > 0 are relevant). By definition, there are at most log2
(
1
wmin
)
different values of ι for ι > 0,
and log2
(
T
mwmin
)
≤ log2
(
T
wmin
)
different values for κ > 0 when ι > 0. The second inequality is
by the definition of the confidence set; the third and the fifth are by Cauchy’s inequality; the fourth
is by the assumption of the lemma. Substituting the values of wmin and m into the last expression,
we can get the desired result.
H Proofs of Lemma 5.1 and 5.3
To prove Lemma 5.1 and 5.3, the following lemma is a useful tool. In the following texts, we let
vk(s) :=
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
1st=s, and write the joint policy (pi
1
k, p¯i
2
k) as p¯ik .
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Lemma H.1. Let v ≥ 1. Then ∀s, with high probability,∑k Tk1vk(s)≤v = O˜(vDSA).
Proof. Under Assumption 1, the times a state is visited within an interval of lengthD is in average
no less than 1 (no matter what policies the players play). Consider any arbitrarily chosen time frame
[τ, τ ′) ⊂ [1, T ]. In this time frame, there are ⌊ τ ′−τ2D ⌋ intervals each with length 2D. By Markov’s
inequality, the probability s is visited at least once within each interval is lower bounded by 12 . With
Azuma-Hoeffding’s inequality, we have with probability at least 1− δT 2 that
τ ′−1∑
t=τ
1st=s ≥
1
2
⌊τ ′ − τ
2D
⌋
−
√⌊τ ′ − τ
2D
⌋
log
(
T 2
δ
)
≥ 1
4
⌊τ ′ − τ
2D
⌋
− 4 log
(
T 2
δ
)
≥ 1
4
τ ′ − τ
2D
− 1
4
− 4 log
(
T 2
δ
)
, (23)
where the second inequality is easily verified by substracting RHS fromLHS, and the third inequality
is by the property of the floor function. Using an union bound over all possible τ and τ ′, we get that
(23) holds for all τ, τ ′ with probability at least 1− δ.
Now apply (23) to all phases k with vk(s) ≤ v, and sum all of them up. Then we get∑
k:vk(s)≤v
vk(s) ≥
∑
k:vk(s)≤v
(
Tk
8D
− 1
4
− 4 log
(
T 2
δ
))
or ∑
k:vk(s)≤v
Tk ≤ 8D
∑
k:vk(s)≤v
(
vk(s) +
1
4
+ 4 log(T 2/δ)
)
. (24)
Since there are at most SA log2 T phases, the RHS of (24) is further bounded by(
8vD + 2D + 32D log(T 2/δ)
)
SA log2 T , which proves this lemma.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. p¯i2k is not well-defined if and only if there is a s such that vk(s) =∑tk+1−1
t=tk
1st=s = 0. The proof is done by simply applying Lemma H.1 with v = 1 together
with a union bound over all states s.
We prove Lemma 5.3 by proving the following Lemma H.2 and H.3.
Lemma H.2.∑
k
Tk1{p¯i2k is well-defined}1
{
∃s, µ(M, p¯ik, s) > 2vk(s)
Tk
}
≤ O˜(D3S4A) with high probability.
Lemma H.3.∑
k
Tk1{p¯i2k is well-defined}1
{
sp(h(M1k , p¯ik, ·)) > 2D
}
≤ O˜(D3S5A) with high probability.
H.1 Proof of Lemma H.2
Proof of Lemma H.2. This lemma says, the stationary distribution of the irreducible Markov chain
induced by pi1k and p¯i
2
k won’t exceed the empirical distribution too much in most steps. To prove
Lemma H.2, we will compare three transition probabilities:
p¯k(s
′|s) := p(s′|s, pi1k, p¯i2k) =
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
1st=sp(s
′|s, pi1k, pi2t )∑tk+1−1
t=tk
1st=s
,
pˆk(s
′|s) :=
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
1st=s1st+1=s′∑tk+1−1
t=tk
1st=s
,
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p˜k(s
′|s) :=
∑tk+1−2
t=tk
1st=s1st+1=s′ + 1stk+1−1=s1stk=s′∑tk+1−1
t=tk
1st=s
,
and use perturbation analysis to claim that when they are close enough, the stationary distributions
they induce will also be close. Here, pˆk is constructed by counting empirical transitions. p˜k is
only slightly modified from pˆk: the last term in the numerator changes from 1stk+1−11stk+1 to
1stk+1−1
1stk
. Under the condition that p¯i2k is well-defined,
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
1st=s 6= 0 ∀s, which means
that p˜k has non-zero probability to reach any states from any states, hence inducing an irreducible
Markov chain. p¯k also induces an irreducible Markov chain by Assumption 1. We denote the
stationary distributions corresponding to p¯k and p˜k by µ¯k and µ˜k.
We will see that µ˜k is exactly the same as the empirical distribution (i.e., µ˜k(s) =
vk(s)
Tk
). By
Theorem C.2, when two transition probabilities are close enough, their stationary distributions will
also be close. We will argue that except for a constant amount of steps, |p¯k(s′|s)− pˆk(s′|s)| ≤ 12DS
and |pˆk(s′|s) − p˜k(s′|s)| ≤ 12DS hold for all s, s′. When they both hold, we can use Theorem C.2
with ‖E‖∞ = maxs,s′ |p¯k(s′|s)− p˜k(s′|s)| ≤ 1DS and bound |µ¯k(s)− µ˜k(s)| ≤ 12 µ¯k(s). This will
directly imply µ¯k(s) ≤ 2µ˜k(s) = 2vkTk .
From the discussion above, Lemma H.2 is proved as long as the three following lemmas (Lemma
H.4, H.5, H.6) are proved.
Lemma H.4.∑
k
Tk1{p¯i2k is well-defined}1
{
∃s, s′, |p¯k(s′|s)− pˆk(s′|s)| > 1
2DS
}
≤ O˜(D3S4A) w.h.p.
Lemma H.5.∑
k
Tk1{p¯i2k is well-defined}1
{
∃s, s′, |pˆk(s′|s)− p˜k(s′|s)| > 1
2DS
}
≤ O˜(D2S3A) w.h.p.
Lemma H.6.
µ˜k(s) =
vk(s)
Tk
.
Proof of Lemma H.4. Fix s, s′, and k. Consider the martingale difference sequence defined by
Yt := 1st=s
(
p(s′|s, pi1k(t), pi2t )− 1st+1=s′
)
, where k(t) denotes the phase to which time step t
belongs. By Lemma B.2, for any τ ≤ T + 1, with probability at least 1− 2δ/T ,∣∣∣∣∣
τ−1∑
t=tk
Yt
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2
√
Vtk,τ log(T
2δ−1) +
√
5 log(T 2δ−1). (25)
Here Vtk,τ =
∑τ−1
t=tk
qt(1 − qt) ≤
∑τ−1
t=tk
qt ≤
∑τ−1
t=tk
1st=s where qt := 1st=sp(s
′|s, pi1k(t), pi2t ) ≤
1st=s. With an union bound, we have that (25) holds for all τ with probability at least 1− 2δ. Now
pick τ to be tk+1, and thus Vtk,tk+1 ≤
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
1st=s = vk(s). Then we have
|p¯k(s′|s)− pˆk(s′|s)| =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
1st=s(p(s
′|s, pi1k, pi2t )− 1st+1=s′)
vk(s)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 2
√
log(T 2δ−1)
vk(s)
+
√
5 log(T 2δ−1)
vk(s)
with probability at least 1 − 2δ. Another union bound over s′ lets the above inequality holds for all
s′ with probability at least 1− 2Sδ.
We need about vk(s) ≥ 25D2S2 log(T 2δ−1) to make |p¯k(s′|s)− pˆk(s′|s)| ≤ 12DS ∀s′ in the above
inequality. By Lemma H.1, we see that the number of steps not satisfying this condition is upper
bounded by O˜(D3S3A). Another union bound over s proves the lemma.
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Proof of Lemma H.5. By the construction of p˜k, |p˜k(s′|s) − pˆk(s′|s)| ≤ 1vk(s) ∀s′. Again, we use
Lemma H.1 and set the threshold v = Θ˜(2DS) to make |p˜k(s′|s) − pˆk(s′|s)| ≤ 12DS ∀s′. By
Lemma H.1, this will hold except for O˜(D2S2A) steps. An union bound over states leads to the
O˜(D2S3A) bound.
Proof of Lemma H.6. We only need to check whether the equation µ˜k(s
′) =
∑
s µ˜k(s)p˜k(s
′|s)
holds for all s, s′. Indeed,
∑
s
µ˜k(s)p˜k(s
′|s) =
∑
s
vk(s)
Tk
∑tk+1−2
t=tk
1st=s1st+1=s′ + 1stk+1−1=s1stk=s′
vk(s)
=
∑tk+1−2
t=tk
1st+1=s′ + 1stk=s′
Tk
= µ˜k(s
′).
H.2 Proof of Lemma H.3
Proof of Lemma H.3. By Assumption 1, the maximum mean first passage time under model M
and policy pair (pi1k, p¯i
2
k) does not exceed D, i.e., T
π1k,π¯
2
k(M) ≤ D. Then by Theorem C.9, we
know that if all transition probabilities in the Markov chain induced by (M1k , pi
1
k, p¯i
2
k) is perturbed
from that induced by (M,pi1k, p¯i
2
k) within the amount of
1
8DS2 , the former’s maximum mean first
passage time can be bounded by two times the latter’s, i.e., T π
1
k,π¯
2
k(M1k ) ≤ 2T π
1
k,π¯
2
k(M). This
also implies that (M1k , pi
1
k, p¯i
2
k) induces an irreducible Markov chain. Finally, by Remark M.1,
we have sp(h(M1k , pi
1
k, p¯i
2
k, ·)) ≤ T π
1
k,π¯
2
k(M1k ). Combining the three inequalities above, we can
have sp(h(M1k , pi
1
k, p¯i
2
k, ·)) ≤ 2D. As a result, to prove this theorem, we only need to bound the
number of steps in phases where there exist s, s′ such that the transition probability difference
|p1k(s′|s, pi1k, p¯i2k)−p(s′|s, pi1k, p¯i2k)| is larger than 18DS2 (p1k is the transition kernel ofM1k ). We define
the event Ek(s) =
{∃s′, |p1k(s′|s, pi1k, p¯i2k)− p(s′|s, pi1k, p¯i2k)| > 18DS2 }, and Ek = {∃s, Ek(s) = 1}.
Our goal is to prove
∑
k Tk1Ek ≤ O˜(D3S5A).
Fix k. Suppose that p¯i2k is well-defined. By the definition of p¯i
2
k and the triangle inequality, we have
|p1k(s′|s, pi1k, p¯i2k)− p(s′|s, pi1k, p¯i2k)| ≤
1
vk(s)
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
1st=s|p1k(s′|st, pit)− p(s′|st, pit)|. (26)
Define εi := 2
−i, and define
Gk(s, ε) = {t ∈ [tk, tk+1) : st = s and ε < max
s′
|p1k(s′|st, pit)− p(s′|st, pit)| ≤ 2ε},
and gk(s, ε) := |Gk(s, ε)|, i.e., gk(s, ε) is the number of steps t in phase k such that st = s and the
maximum transition probability error at that step is between ε and 2ε. With these definitions, we
can continue to upper bound (26) by
|p1k(s′|s, pi1k, p¯i2k)− p(s′|s, pi1k, p¯i2k)| ≤
1
vk(s)
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
1st=s|p1k(s′|st, pit)− p(s′|st, pit)|
≤ 1
vk(s)

 ∑
2εi>
1
24DS2
2εigk(s, εi) +
1
24DS2
vk(s)


=
1
24DS2
+
⌊log2(48DS
2)⌋∑
i=1
2εigk(s, εi)
vk(s)
. (27)
If |p1k(s′|s, pi1k, p¯i2k)− p(s′|s, pi1k, p¯i2k)| > 18DS2 , then by (27) we have
vk(s)
24DS2
≤
⌊log2(48DS
2)⌋∑
i=1
εigk(s, εi). (28)
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Note that since steps counted in Gk(s, ε) have maximum transition errors greater that ε, by Lemma
5.2, with high probability,
∑
k gk(s, ε) won’t exceed
c1A
ε2 , for some c1 hides logarithmic terms. Now
sum the above equation over phases where Ek(s) holds, we get that
∑
k:Ek(s)
vk(s)
24DS2
≤
∑
k:Ek(s)
⌊log2(48DS
2)⌋∑
i=1
εigk(s, εi) ≤
⌊log2(48DS
2)⌋∑
i=1
c1A
εi
≤ 48c1DS2A log2(48DS2)
or
∑
k:Ek(s)
vk(s) ≤ O˜(D2S4A) holds with high probability. Similar to the proof of Lemma H.1,
we use (23) and lower bound
∑
k:Ek(s)
vk(s) ≥
∑
k:Ek(s)
(
Tk
8D − O˜(1)
)
. Combining the lower
bound and the upper bound, we get
∑
k:Ek(s)
Tk ≤ O˜(D3S4A). Finally, summing over s, we get
the desired bound.
I Proofs of Lemma 5.4 and 5.5
Proof of Lemma 5.4. Define notations: p¯ik = (pi
1
k, p¯i
2
k), p¯k(s
′|s) := p(s′|s, p¯ik), h¯k(s) :=
h(M, p¯ik, s), ρ¯k := ρ(M, p¯ik), r¯k(s) := r(s, p¯ik), rt := r(st, at).
By the construction of p¯i2k, we have
p¯k(s
′|s) =
∑
a2
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
1st=spit(a
2)
vk(s)
p(s′|s, pi1k, a2) =
1
vk(s)
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
1st=sp(s
′|s, pi1k, pi2t ) (29)
and
r¯k(s) =
∑
a2
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
1st=spi
2
t (a
2)
vk(s)
r(s, pi1k, a
2) =
1
vk(s)
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
1st=sr(s, pi
1
k, pi
2
t ). (30)
Our target in phase k can be decomposed as:
Tkρ¯k −
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
rt =
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
(ρ¯k − r¯k(st)) +
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
(r¯k(st)− rt) , (31)
Now manipulate individual terms.
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
(ρ¯k − r¯k(st)) =
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
(∑
s′
p¯k(s
′|st)h¯k(s′)− h¯k(st)
)
=
∑
s,s′
vk(s)p¯k(s
′|s)h¯k(s′)−
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
h¯k(st)
=
∑
s,s′
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
1st=sp(s
′|s, pi1k, pi2t )h¯k(s′)−
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
h¯k(st)
=
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
∑
s′
p(s′|st, pi1k, pi2t )h¯k(s′)−
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
h¯k(st), (32)
where the third equality follows from (29);
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
(r¯k(st)− rt) =
∑
s
vk(s)r¯k(s)−
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
rt
=
∑
s
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
1st=sr(s, pi
1
k, pi
2
t )−
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
rt
=
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
r(st, pi
1
k, pi
2
t )−
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
rt, (33)
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where the second equality follows from (30). Substituting (32) and (33) into (31), we get
Tkρ¯k −
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
rt = h¯k(stk+1)− h¯k(stk) +
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
(
Y 1t + Y
2
t
)
, (34)
where Y 1t :=
(∑
s′ p(s
′|st, pi1k, pi2t )h¯k(s′)− h¯k(st+1)
)
, and Y 2t :=
(
r(st, pi
1
k, pi
2
t )− rt
)
. It seems
that Y 1t and Y
2
t have expectations of zero and should be able to be bounded with Bernstein’s
inequality. Nevertheless, one needs to be careful about that h¯k depends on p¯i
2
k, which is only
known after phase k ends. In other words, h¯k is not Ft-measurable for t ∈ ph(k), where
Ft−1 := {s1, a1, · · · , st}. The solution is as follows. Let D be the set where h¯k possibly lies.
We discretize D and use the Bernstein bound on all discretization points. Finally, we use the fact
that h¯k is not far from the nearest discretization point to bound the sum of Y
1
t .
Let D := [−D,D]S , and thus h¯k ∈ D. Clearly, there is a discretization Dd with |Dd| ≤ (2DST )S
such that any h ∈ D can find some hd ∈ Dd with |h(s) − hd(s)| ≤ 1ST ∀s. Now let Y
1(j)
t :=(∑
s′ p(s
′|st, pi1k, pi2t )h(j)(s′)− h(j)(st+1)
)
for every h(j) ∈ Dd, j = 1, ..., (2DST )S. Now Y 1(j)t ’s
are martingale difference sequences with respect to Ft−1, so we can apply Azuma-Hoeffding’s
inequality and bound
∑
k
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
Y
1(j)
t ≤
√
log((2DST )Sδ−1)
2
T (2D)2 (35)
with probability at least 1 − δ(2DST )S . Using the union bound, (35) holds for all j with probability
at least 1− δ. Also, there exists a j such that∑tk+1−1t=tk
(
Y 1t − Y 1(j)t
)
≤ Tk × 2SST = 2TkT . Thus we
have
∑
k
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
Y 1t ≤ O˜(D
√
ST ) (36)
with high probability. We also have
∑
k
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
Y 2t ≤ O˜(
√
T ) by Azuma-Hoeffding’s inequality.
Also, h¯k(stk+1)− h¯k(stk) ≤ 2D. Collecting terms, we get the desired bound.
Proof of Lemma 5.5. First fix k. Denote the transition probabilities of the optimistically selected
modelM1k by p
1
k(·|·, ·, ·). In this proof, we define h˜(·) := h(M1k , p¯ik, ·), h(·) := h(M, p¯ik, ·), µ˜(·) :=
µ(M1k , p¯ik, ·), µ(·) := µ(M, p¯ik, ·), ρ˜ := ρ(M1k , p¯ik), ρ := ρ(M, p¯ik), r(·) := r(s, p¯ik), p˜(s′|s) :=
p1k(s
′|s, p¯ik), p(s′|s) := p(s′|s, p¯ik).
By Bellman equation and the properties of irreducible Markov chains, we have
ρ = r(s) +
∑
s′
p(s′|s)h(s′)− h(s)
ρ˜ = r(s) +
∑
s′
p˜(s′|s)h˜(s′)− h˜(s)
for all s. Therefore, we can write (for any s)
ρ˜− ρ =
∑
s′
(
p˜(s′|s)h˜(s′)− p(s′|s)h(s′)
)
− h˜(s) + h(s)
=
∑
s′
(p˜(s′|s)− p(s′|s)) h˜(s′) +
∑
s′
(p(s′|s)− δs,s′)
(
h˜(s′)− h(s′)
)
. (37)
Thus,
Tk(ρ˜− ρ) =
∑
s
Tkµ(s)(ρ˜− ρ)
=
∑
s
Tkµ(s)
∑
s′
(p˜(s′|s)− p(s′|s)) h˜(s′)
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≤
∑
s
Tkµ(s) ‖p˜(·|s)− p(·|s)‖1 sp(h˜), (38)
where the second equality is by using (37) and the property of stationary distribution:∑
s µ(s) (p(s
′|s)− δs,s′) = 0. By the definition of p˜ and p, we have
‖p˜(·|s)− p(·|s)‖1 ≤
∑
a
pit(a)
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
1st=s ‖p˜(·|s, a)− p(·|s, a)‖1
vk(s)
=
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
1st=s ‖p˜(·|s, at)− p(·|s, at)‖1 +
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
Yt
vk(s)
(39)
where Yt := E [qt] − qt, and qt := 1st=s ‖p˜(·|s, at)− p(·|s, at)‖1. To apply Lemma B.2, we note
that |qt| ≤ 2 and VT :=
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
E[Y 2t |Ft−1] ≤ 2
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
E[qt]. Then we can bound
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
(E[qt]− qt) ≤ 2
√√√√(2 tk+1−1∑
t=tk
E[qt]
)
log(T 2δ−1) + 2
√
5 log(T 2δ−1) (40)
with probability at least 1− δ. (40) implies
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
(E[qt]− qt) ≤
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
qt + 17 log(T
2δ−1). (41)
Continuing (38) with the help of (39) and (41), we get
Tk(ρ˜− ρ) ≤ 2D
∑
s
Tkµ(s)
2
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
qt + 17 log(T
2δ−1)
vk(s)
≤ 3D
∑
s
(
2
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
qt + 17 log(T
2δ−1)
)
≤ 6D
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
‖p˜(st, at)− p(st, at)‖1 + O˜(DS)
≤ 12D
√
2S ln
1
δ1
∑
s,a
vk(s, a)√
nk(s, a)
+ O˜(DS),
where we have used the assumptions in this lemma. Now sum over benign phases, we get∑
k:benign
Tk
(
ρ(M1k , p¯ik)− ρ(M, p¯ik)
) ≤∑
k
∑
s,a
vk(s, a)√
nk(s, a)
O˜(D
√
S) +
∑
k
O˜(DS) (42)
≤ 2.5
√
SAT O˜(D
√
S) + O˜(DS2A)
= O˜(DS
√
AT +DS2A).
with high probability. The last inequality is by the following Lemma together with Cauchy’s inequal-
ity.
Lemma I.1 (cf. Lemma 19 of [19]). For any sequence {zi}, i = 1, ..., N with 0 ≤ zi ≤ Zi−1 :=
max{1,∑i−1ℓ=1 zℓ}. LetK be a subset of {1, ..., N}. Then we have∑
i∈K
zi√
Zi−1
≤ (
√
2 + 1)
√
L,
where L :=
∑
i∈K zi.
Proof. ∑
i∈K
zi√
Zi−1
≤ (
√
2 + 1)
∑
i∈K
zi√
Zi +
√
Zi−1
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= (
√
2 + 1)
∑
i∈K
zi · (
√
Zi −
√
Zi−1)
(
√
Zi +
√
Zi−1) · (
√
Zi −
√
Zi−1)
= (
√
2 + 1)
∑
i∈K
(
√
Zi −
√
Zi−1)
≤ (
√
2 + 1)
∑
i∈K
(
√
Li −
√
Li−1) ≤ (
√
2 + 1)
√
L,
where Li :=
∑
ℓ∈K:ℓ≤i zi. We used the inequality√
Zi −
√
Zi−1 ≤
√
Li −
√
Li−1 ⇔ zi√
Li +
√
Li−1
≤ zi√
Zi +
√
Zi−1
.
J Proofs of Lemma 6.1 and 6.2
Proof of lemma 6.1. Note that for any phase k and any episode i that fully lies in phase k, we have
E
[∑τi+1−1
t=τi
r(st, at)
]
= VH(M,pi
1
k, pi
2
i , sτi). Therefore, the terms in
∑
k∆
(5)
k form a martingale
difference sequence with no more than T/H terms. Furthermore, 0 ≤∑τi+1−1t=τi r(st, at) ≤ H . By
Lemma B.1, with probability 1− δ, we have∑k∆(5)k ≤
√
log(δ−1)
2
T
HH
2 = O˜(√HT ).
Proof of Lemma 6.2. Suppose that the value iteration halts at iteration N , then under Assumption 2
and by the proof of Lemma F.2, we have
(1− α)(ρ∗(M+)− γ)e ≤ De ≤ vN+1 − vN = (1 − α) (val{r + PvN} − vN ) . (43)
Since (M1k , p
1
k) is selected based on the vN when the value iteration halts, (43) is equivalent to
ρ∗(M+)− γ ≤ min
π2
{
r(s, pi1k, pi
2) +
∑
s′
p1k(s
′|s, pi1k, pi2)vN (s′)
}
− vN (s). (44)
Besides, the span of the vector vN is bounded by D by Lemma F.3. Now we fix Player 1’s policy
as pi1k in the extended game, and let Player 2 run an H-step SG. The least amount Player 2 has
to pay Player 1 in this SG is minπ2 VH(M
1
k , pi
1
k, pi
2, s) (assuming that the game starts from s),
which can be calculated by dynamic programming. The dynamic programming goes as follows: for
i = 0, ..., H − 1, for all s,
u0(s) = 0,
ui+1(s) = min
a
{r(s, pi1k, a) +
∑
s′
p1k(s
′|s, pi1k, a)ui(s′)},
which, in its vector form, can be written as ui+1 = mina{ra+Paui} by denoting ra(·) := r(·, pi1k , a)
and (Pa)ij := p
1
k(j|i, pi1k, a). We can re-write the induction procedure as
ui+1 − vN = min
a
{ra + PavN + Pa(ui − vN )} − vN
without affecting the solution. By the propertymin{u+ v} ≥ min{u}+min{v}, we have
ui+1 − vN ≥ min
a
{ra + PavN}+min
a
{Pa(ui − vN )} − vN (45)
By (44), mina{ra + PavN} − vN ≥ ρ∗(M+) − γ, and since Pa is stochastic, Pa(ui − vN ) ≥
mins′{ui(s′) − vN (s′)}. Combining them with (45), we have ui+1(s) − vN (s) ≥ ρ∗(M+) −
γ + mins′{ui(s′) − vN (s′)} for all s. Then by induction, we can easily prove ui(s) − vN (s) ≥
i (ρ∗(M+)− γ) + mins′{u0(s′) − vN (s′)}, and therefore, ui(s) ≥ i (ρ∗(M+)− γ) + vN (s) −
maxs′ vN (s
′) ≥ i (ρ∗(M+)− γ)−D.
Let i = H and note that ρ∗(M+) = maxM˜ maxπ1 minπ2 ρ(M˜, pi
1, pi2) ≥ minπ2 ρ(M1k , pi1k, pi2, s).
The above result translates to minπ2 VH(M
1
k , pi
1
k, pi
2, s) ≥ H minπ2 ρ(M1k , pi1k, pi2, s) − D − Hγ,
which bounds∆
(2)
k by
∑
i∈ph(k)(D +Hγ).
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K Proof of Theorem K.1 and Lemma 6.3
Theorem K.1. (Sample Complexity Bound of UCSG. cf. Theorem 1 [9]) Given δ > 0, with prob-
ability at least 1 − δ, for any 0 < ε < 1, UCSG produces a sequence of policies pi1k, that yield at
most O˜(H2S2Aε2 ) episodes i such that |VH(M,pi1k, pi2i , sτi)− VH(M1k , pi1k, pi2i , sτi)| > ε.
Theorem K.1 mainly follows from the following Lemma K.6 and K.7. In [9] the analysis of sample
complexity is facilitated by partitioning the state-action space. The state-action pairs are grouped
into different categories according to two indices. The first index, importance, measures in log-scale
the relative occurrence frequency of (s, a) with respect to a fixed constant under the policy. The
second index, knownness, measures also in log-scale the ratio of the total number of observations to
the occurrence frequency. Here we modify the the definition of weight, importance, and knownness
for a state-joint action (s, a) = (s, a1, a2) defined below to have a partition of the state-joint-action
space S ×A = S ×A1 ×A2 for each episode.
Definition K.2. Define the weight of a state-joint-action pair (s, a) under joint policy pii in episode
i as the expected occurrence frequency of (s, a) in episode i,
wi(s, a) :=
τi+1−1∑
t=τi
P(st = s, at = a|at ∼ pii, sτi).
The setting in [9] is somewhat different from two-player zero-sum SGs. In the episodic RL setting
after an episode is over, a new episode starts afresh with the same initial distribution p0, while in
the non-episodic setting, initial state sτi in each episode is sampled from a different distribution.
Initial state distributions do not matter that much in our setting except we need the initial state sτi to
compute the expected frequency wi(s, a).
Definition K.3. Define the importance of a state-joint-action pair (s, a) in episode i as
ιi(s, a) := max
{
zj : zj ≤ wi(s, a)
wmin
}
,
where z1 = 0 and zj = 2
j−2 ∀j = 2, 3, ...
Definition K.4. Define the knownness of a a state-joint-action pair (s, a) in episode i as
κi(s, a) := max
{
zj : zj ≤
nk(i)(s, a)
mwi(s, a)
}
,
where z1 = 0 and zj = 2
j−2 ∀j = 2, 3, ...
Definition K.5. We can now categorize state-joint-action pairs (s, a) into subsets
Xi,κ,ι := {(s, a) ∈ Xi : κi(s, a) = κ, ιi(s, a) = ι},
and X¯i = S ×A\Xi, where Xi = {(s, a) ∈ S ×A : ιi(s, a) > 0}.
In contrast to the original definitions [9] which are designated for each phase k in the episodic RL
setting, in our setting, weight wi(s, a), importance ιi(s, a), knownness κi(s, a) are now indexed for
each episode i because Player 2 may have arbitrary policies in different episodes.
Theorem K.1 mainly follows from the following Lemma K.6 and K.7. Select m =
512SH2(log logH)2 log2(8T 2SH) ln(6/δ1)
ε2 , δ1 :=
δ
2UmaxS
, Umax := SA log2 T and wmin :=
ε
4HSA
for any 0 < ε < H , and any 0 < δ < 1 and then we have the following two lemmas.
LemmaK.6. (cf. Lemma 2 in [9]) LetE be the number of episodes i for which there are κ and ι with
|Xi,κ,ι| > κ, i.e. E =
∑∞
i=1 1{∃(κ, ι) : |Xi,κ,ι| > κ} and assume that m ≥ 6H
2
ε ln(2Emax/δ),
where Emax = log2
(
H
wmin
)
log2(SA). Then P(E ≤ 6SAEmaxm) ≥ 1− δ/2.
Proof. The proof mainly follows as Lemma 2 [9]. Here we point out the differences between the
original UCFH algorithm [9] and our UCSG, when we remove the input ε.
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1. Their stopping rule for phase k is dependent on the specification of ε.
2. They set an upper bound for the maximum number of executions for each state-action pair
(s, a), which is determined beforehand and hardcoded in their algorithm.
3. Our algorithm only needs input δ to specify the failure probability and has (ε, δ)-PAC
bounds for arbitrarily selected ε.
The original UCFH nearly doesn’t need the parameter ε except at one place: their phases stops when
“∃(s, a), vk(s, a) ≥ max{mwmin, nk(s, a)} and nk(s, a) < SmH .” Since wmin andm are defined
through ε, this stopping rule requires ε to be known by the algorithm. They need this because they
would like to controlUmax, the total number of phases run by the algorithm. In their case, having this
stopping rule, Umax ≤ SA log2 SmHmwmin = SA log2 SHwmin because phase change won’t be triggered
when nk(s, a) < mwmin or nk(s, a) > SmH . However, since we assume that the time horizon T
is known, we can simply use Umax ≤ SA log2 T , and this can simplify our stopping rule to only
“∃(s, a), vk(s, a) ≥ nk(s, a).”
Therefore, we can totally abandon the use of ε in our algorithm, but enjoy their analysis results.
The results automatically hold for arbitrarily selected ε. However, since we bound the number
of κ by log2(4HSAT/ε) in Lemma K.7, we cannot let ε tends to 0 too fast. (The minimum ε
we will select is ε0 = min{H,
√
(H3S2A)/T} as in the proof of Lemma 6.3, where we select
H = max{D, 3
√
D2T/(S2A)} for Theorem 3.2 ).
Lemma K.7. (cf. Lemma 3 in [9]) Assume M ∈ Mk. If |Xi,κ,ι| ≤ κ for all (κ, ι) and
for all 0 < ε ≤ 1 and m ≥ 512CH2ε2 (log2 log2H)2 log2
(
4HSAT
ε
)
log2(SA) ln(6/δ1). Then
|VH(M1k , pi1k, pi2i )− VH(M,pi1k, pi2i )| ≤ ε.
Proof. It mainly follows the same proof as Lemma 3 in [9]. It was shown sufficient to let m ≥
512C(log2 log2H)
2|K × I|H2ε2 ln(6/δ1). The only differences are in the upper bounds for |K × I|.
In UCFH, the maximum number of executions of each state-action pair is set equal tomSH . Thus
their knownness κ(s, a) is no more than n(s,a)mwmin ≤ 4S
2AH2
ε , whereas in our setting, since n(s, a) ≤
T , κ(s, a) ≤ n(s,a)mwmin ≤ 4HSATε . Thus in our setting |K × I| ≤ log2(4HSATε ) log2(SA).
Proof of Lemma 6.3. Let ε0 :=min
{
H,
√
(H3S2A)/T
}
, and δ0 := δ/⌈log2(H/ε0)⌉. We invoke
logarithmically many times the bound in Theorem K.1 and use the union bound to obtain the regret.
By assumption, for j = 1, ..., ⌈log2(H/ε0)⌉, with probability no less than 1 − δ0, there are at most
O˜(4jS2A) episodes that are not (2−jH)-optimal. Then the total error is bounded by∑
k
∑
i∈ph(k)
∣∣∣VH(M1k , pi1k, pi2i , sτi)− VH(M,pi1k, pi2i , sτi)∣∣∣
:=
∑
k
∑
i∈ph(k)
ri =
∑
i:ri≤ε0
ri +
∑
i:ri>ε0
ri
≤ ε0 T
H
+
⌈log2(H/ε0)⌉∑
j=1
O˜(4jS2A)(2−j+1H)
= ε0
T
H
+ 4(2⌈log2(H/ε0)⌉ − 1)O˜(HS2A)
≤ ε0 T
H
+ 8
O˜(H2S2A)
ε0
= O˜(S
√
HAT +HS2A).
L Proofs for Offline Training Complexity
Proof of Theorem 7.1. Define
Kε := {k : ρ∗(M)−min
π2
ρ(M,pi1k, pi
2) > ε},
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K ′ε := Kε ∩ {k : phase k is benign}.
Also, define
Reg(off)′ε :=
∑
k∈K′ε
Tk(ρ
∗(M)−min
π2
ρ(M,pi1k, pi
2))
= Reg(on)′ε +
∑
k∈K′ε
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
(
rt −min
π2
ρ(M,pi1k, pi
2)
)
.
(46)
where Reg(on)′ε is defined as a summation similar to Reg
(on)
T except that it is summed only over
time steps in phases k ∈ K ′ε. Besides, analogous to the definition of Lε, we define L′ε :=∑
k:benign Tk1{ρ∗(M)−minπ2 ρ(M,pi1k, pi2) > ε}.
We will argue (a) the order of Reg(off)′ε does not exceed that of Reg
(on)′
ε , and (b) the upper bound of
Reg(on)′ε is similar to that of Reg
(on)
T except that the dependency on T is replaced by L
′
ε.
To show (a), we note that the extra terms in Reg(off)′ε compared to Reg
(on)′
ε are the sum of
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
(
rt −min
π2
ρ(M,pi1k, pi
2)
)
=
7∑
n=5
Λ
(n)
k ,
Λ
(5)
k :=
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
(
rt − ρ(M,pi1k, pi2k)
)
,
Λ
(6)
k :=
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
(
ρ(M,pi1k, pi
2
k)− ρ(M2k , pi1k, pi2k, stk)
)
,
Λ
(7)
k :=
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
(
ρ(M2k , pi
1
k, pi
2
k, stk)−min
π2
ρ(M,pi1k, pi
2)
)
,
over k ∈ K ′ε. Λ(7)k is bounded by Tkγk by (6); the bound of this term is the same as that ofΛ(1)k . Λ(5)k
and Λ
(6)
k are symmetric to Λ
(4)
k and Λ
(3)
k respectively (note that the p¯i
2
k we constructed in Section
5.1 will be identical to pi2k in the offline setting). Therefore, we can use the same bounds for the
corresponding terms.
Nowwe proceed to argue (b) and bound Reg(on)′ε . We will largely reuse the regret analysis we already
done for Reg
(on)
T , but only sum up the contribution from phases inK
′
ε.
The contribution to Reg(on)′ε from Λ
(1)
k is∑
k∈K′ε
Tkγk =
∑
k∈K′ε
Tk/
√
tk; (47)
the contribution from Λ
(3)
k is as shown in (42):∑
k∈K′ε
∑
s,a
vk(s, a)√
nk(s, a)
O˜(D
√
S) +
∑
k∈K′ε
O˜(DS); (48)
finally, the contribution from Λ
(4)
k is as shown in (34):∑
k∈K′ε
(
h¯k(stk+1−1)− h¯(stk) +
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
(Y 1t + Y
2
t )
)
. (49)
Reg(on)′ε is then bounded by the sum of (47)-(49). By lemma I.1, (47) is bounded by (
√
2 + 1)
√
L′ε,
and the first term in (48) is bounded by O˜(√SAL′ε)O˜(D√S) = O˜(DS√AL′ε) by Cauchy inequal-
ity. The second term in (48) can be still bounded by O˜(DS2A). Since the martingale difference se-
quences in (49) are now summing over a total of L′ε steps, (49) is now bounded byDSA+D
√
SL′ε
(cf. (36)).
31
As a whole, we conclude that Reg(on)′ε ≤ O˜(DS
√
AL′ε + DS
2A), and hence Reg(off)′ε ≤
O˜(DS√AL′ε +DS2A) by the argument in (a).
Note that by the definition ofK ′ε, we have
Reg(off)′ε =
∑
k∈K′ε
Tk(ρ
∗(M)−min
π2
ρ(M,pi1k, pi
2))
≥
∑
k∈K′ε
Tkε = εL
′
ε. (50)
Combining (50) with the upper bound of Reg(off)′ε just established, we have
εL′ε ≤ O˜(DS
√
AL′ε +DS
2A),
which has the solution
L′ε ≤ O˜
(
D2S2A
ε2
)
.
Comparing the definitions of Lε and L
′
ε, and by Lemma 5.3, we get
Lε ≤ L′ε + O˜(D3S5A) = O˜
(
D3S5A+
D2S2A
ε2
)
.
Finally, we remark on how to select a single stationary policy after we have run the algorithm for T
steps. Note that in our proofs, we actually bound the single step regret in phase k through
ρ∗(M)−min
π2
ρ(M,pi1k, pi
2) ≤ min
π2
ρ(M1k , pi
1
k, stk)− ρ(M2k , pi1k, pi2k, stk) + 2γk (51)
because LHS is 1Tk
∑7
n=1 Λ
(n)
k while RHS is
1
Tk
∑6
n=2 Λ
(n)
k +2γk. Note that the terms on RHS can
all be obtained by the algorithm, so they form an available upper bound for the LHS. Let uk denotes
the RHS. Then the previous proofs actually proved that∑
k
Tk1{uk > ε} ≤ O˜
(
D3S5A+
D2S2A
ε2
)
holds with high probability. Therefore, if T > Ω˜
(
D3S5A+ D
2S2A
ε2
)
, there will be some k such
that uk < ε. Since the algorithm knows uk, it can just select the minimum of all uk’s among all
phases. That will output a policy pi1k such that ρ
∗(M)−minπ2 ρ(M,pi1k, pi2) ≤ ε.
Proof of Theorem 7.2.
Reg(off)ε :=
∑
k∈Kε
Tk(ρ
∗(M)−min
π2
ρ(M,pi1k, pi
2))
= Reg(on)ε +
∑
k∈Kε
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
(
rt −min
π2
ρ(M,pi1k, pi
2)
)
,
where Reg(on)ε is the sum of∆k over k ∈ Kε. Of the six regret terms (5),∆(4)k dominates over∆(1)k ,
∆
(3)
k , ∆
(5)
k , and ∆
(6)
k . So we only look at the ∆
(2)
k and ∆
(4)
k . ∆
(2)
k is bounded by
Tk
H D + Tkγk.
Summing over k ∈ Kε by Lemma I.1 gives LεH D + O˜(
√
Lε). Thus its average error is bounded by
O˜(D/H + 1/√Lε). By takingH = D/(2ε) we have the sample complexity for the second term is
O˜(1/ε2). On the other hand, by Theorem K.1, ∆(4)k has sample complexity bound O˜(HS2A/ε2).
By substituting H = D/(2ε) gives the dominating sample complexity bound O˜(DS2A/ε3). We
argue again the order of Reg(off)ε does not exceed that of Reg
(on)
ε . To show this, we note that the extra
terms in Reg(off)ε compared to Reg
(on)
ε are the sum of
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
(
rt −min
π2
ρ(M,pi1k, pi
2)
)
=
11∑
n=7
∆
(n)
k ,
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∆
(7)
k :=
∑
i∈ph(k)
(
τi+1−1∑
t=τi
r(st, at)− VH(M,pik, sτi)
)
,
∆
(8)
k :=
∑
i∈ph(k)
(
VH(M,pik, sτi)− VH(M2k , pik, sτi)
)
,
∆
(9)
k :=
∑
i∈ph(k)
(
VH(M
2
k , pik, sτi)−Hρ(M2k , pik, sτi)
)
,
∆
(10)
k :=
∑
i∈ph(k)
(
Hρ(M2k , pik, sτi)−H min
π2
ρ(M,pi1k, pi
2, sτi)
)
,
∆
(11)
k := 2H,
over k ∈ Kε. This decomposition mirrors that in (5) where ∆(7)k , ∆(8)k , ∆(9)k , ∆(10)k and ∆(11)k are
symmetric to the ∆
(5)
k , ∆
(4)
k , ∆
(2)
k , ∆
(1)
k , and ∆
(6)
k in (5), respectively, and we can use the same
bounds for the corresponding terms.
Finally, we can pick an ε-optimal policy pi1k after the algorithm has run for T > O˜
(
DS2A
ε3
)
steps.
The way is similar to that described in the proof of Theorem 7.1.
M Other Technical Lemmas
RemarkM.1. Under Assumption 1, note that for any stationary policy pi, we have sp(h(M,pi, ·)) ≤
T π(M). Indeed,
h(M,pi, s) = Eπs
[ ∞∑
t=1
rt − ρ(M,pi)
]
≤ T πs→s′(M) + Eπs′
[ ∞∑
t=1
rt − ρ(M,pi)
]
= T πs→s′(M) + h(M,pi, s
′).
RemarkM.2. Imagine an MDP where all transitions from s 6= s′ remain the same while s′ becomes
an absorbing state; rewards on s 6= s′ are all 1 and 0 on s′. Now maxπ1 maxπ2 T π
1,π2
s→s′ (M) is
equivalent to the maximum reward on this MDP, which can be achieved by stationary joint policy by
both players.
N Regularization/Constraint-based Approach for Assumption 1
It is possible to improve the O˜(D3S5A) term in the regret bound under Assumption 1. Note that this
term mainly comes from Lemma H.3, which says that to wait until sp(h(M1k , pi
1
k, p¯i
2
k, ·)) < 2D, we
need to pay O˜(D3S5A) regret. However, if we can know the value of D in advance, the optimistic
modelM1k can be selected based on the following constrained optimization problem:
M1k = argmax
M˜∈Mk
max
π1
min
π2
ρ(M˜, pi1, pi2, stk),
subject to ∀pi1, pi2 ∈ ΠSR, sp(h(M˜, pi1, pi2, ·)) ≤ D.
Clearly, the true modelM still lies in this feasible set, so this is a valid way to selectM1k . It is also
possible to convert this into a regularized optimization problem as demonstrated by [3]. Neverthe-
less, we are not aware of any practical algorithm that can solve either optimization problem. We just
demonstrated in this paper that the benefit of this regularization/constraint-based approach is only
on the additive constant but not on the asymptotic performance.
33
